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[Tihe old ideas die hard, especially when they are emotionally
as well as intellectually dear to one. It was pleasant to believe,
for example, that much of Nature was forever beyond the
tampering reach of man... comforting to suppose that the
stream of life would flow on through time in whatever course
that God had appointed for it .... These beliefs have almost
been a part of me for as long as r have thought about such
things. To have them even vaguely threatened was so shocking
that... I shut my mind .... But that does no good, and I
have now opened my eyes and my mind.'
* Associate Professor, New England School of Law; J.D., 1987, Cornell Law
School, B.A., 1980, Dartmouth College. The author thanks the Board of Trustees and
Dean John OBrien of the New England School of Law for the stipend that made
this Article possible.
1. Letter from Rachel Carson to Ruth N. Anshen (Jan. 30, 1958), in PAUL
BROOKS, THE HOUSE OF LIFE: RACHEL CARSON AT WORK 9-10 (1972).
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In October 1994, the New York Times predicted that the 103d
Congress would fail in its efforts to amend the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA or Superfmd),2 a major environmental statute that
had been slated for amendment that term. Had Cassandra,
Greek mythology's misunderstood clairvoyant, been around to of-
fer such a prediction, she might have broken her curse against
being believed;4 the Democratic Congress's failure to revamp
CERCLA in its final days of majority was a foregone conclu-
sion.5 Indeed, for some time now, environmental advocacy has
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995).
3. John H. *Cushman, Jr., Few Environmental Laws Emerge from 103d Congress,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at B12. The article quotes Sierra Club lobbyist Blakeman
Early as characterizing the 103d Congress as "the worst environmental Congress in
two decades" and discusses the political momentum against environmentally benign
legislation and in favor of property owners and business interests. Id. The article
also describes congressional criticism of the Clinton Administration and "the environ-
mental movement itself' for "not exercising enough muscle at the grass roots to
mobilize votes in Congress." Id.
4. Indeed, in Aeschylus's Agamemnon, Cassandra, a prophetess who suffered a
curse of having her visions ignored, sounds like an early Rachel Carson in her open-
ing lines: "[w]oe, woe, alas! Earth, Mother Earth!" Aeschylus, Agamemnon, in SEVEN
FAMOUS GREEK PLAYS 48, 89 (Whitney J. Oates & Eugene O'Neill, Jr. eds., 1950).
Carson herself was aware that when she wrote in defense of natural resources she
would be cast as "a Cassandra." BROOKS, supra note 1, at 214.
5. See, e.g., Gary L. Countryman, Cleaning Up Superfund Program, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1995, at A44. The athor argues for Superfind overhaul, including
the repeal of strict joint and several liability for waste disposed prior to 1987, the
reform of cleanup standards to focus on human health risks, and a review of
cleanup funding to ensure fairness. Id. The article appears to advocate that such re-
forms will eliminate inefficiency in Superfund, such as lawyer transaction costs, but
fails to explain how, for example, replacing joint and several liability with allocated
liability will necessarily reduce litigation. Such articles serve as strong indicators
that Superfund reauthorization will be a complex process encumbered by naive, ill-
conceived reform proposals.
The Clinton Administration nevertheless attempted to build consensus and avoid
confrontation on environmental issues. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Congress Forgoes
Its Bid To Hasten Cleanup of Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al.
The consensus approach[, however,] had been tried with mixed results on
other thorny issues, like logging and grazing on public lands, and with
each compromise the Administration had paid dearly in its standing
among environmentalist allies . . . . In the end, though, no amount of
consensus-building could build enough momentum to send the bill vault-
ing over the final hurdle of partisanship.
Id. at A22.
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been losing all vestiges of bipartisan urgency,6 reducing those
who champion nature to mere Democratic politicians with "green
agendas" and rendering them vulnerable to a familiar arsenal of
accusations of overregulation and taxing and spending One
explanation for this evolution in environmental politics is that
Americans are simply too selfish to sustain a pro-environment
attitude once the warm glow of nature-love wears off and the
chore of trash recycling becomes tedious.8 A less pessimistic
explanation for environmentalism's slipping bipartisan status is
that, now that environmentalism has forged an indelible place
for itself as an issue that demands political attention, it has
begun using its newly developed political muscle to further infil-
trate the system, rather than stiff-arming mainstream politics to
maintain the stance of the apolitical purist.9
6. See 140 CONG. REC. H176 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Boehlert) ("The Republican Heritage for the Environment dates back to President
Teddy Roosevelt, and I would remind my colleagues that it was a Republican
President, Richard Nixon, under whose leadership the Environmental Protection
Agency was created.").
7. See, e.g., Congressional Republicans Take Aim at Extensive List of Environ-
nental Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A14. The article quotes the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, as deriding the nation's environmen-
tal policies because they are "absurdly expensive, creat[ing] far more resistance than
[is] necessary and misallocat[ing] resources." Id.; see also Cushman, supra note 3, at
B12 (observing that "[olnly recently did . . . partisanship[ I really take hold [as a
force against environmentalism]" and quoting a Clinton Administration official as
stating that "if the Republican leader [Senator Robert Dole of Kansas] decides that
he does not want to move something, no matter how much the people back home
want something, there is nothing we can do about it"); Review & Outlook: Running
on Fumes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1994, at A20 (referencing the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 as an example of "why we so need to rein in overzealous regulators").
8. See, e.g., Timothy Aeppel, Not in My Garage: Clean Air Act Triggers Backlash
as Its Focus Shifts to Driving Habits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1995, at Al. "As long as
the fight for cleaner skies focused on big smokestacks, few people cared. They fig-
ured big companies could afford to make changes. But clean air rules are now biting
into everyday life because they tackle a broader range of pollution problems, [caus-
ing] . . . intense backlash . . . ." Id. The article also discusses the efforts of Repub-
licans and conservative Democrats to revise the Clean Air Act to make it less intru-
sive and notes Republican vows to ease other environmental laws, including the
Endangered Species Act. Id.
9. See Scott Allen, Greenhorns No Longer-Pro-environmental Political Party Aim-
ing for National Status, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1995, at A17. Discussing the Green
Party, the article notes that "the Greens began as a protest movement . . . that
viewed electoral politics as a sellout" and observes that, now that the party is seek-
ing mainstream political status, "the Greens have already been charged with their
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Signs of the systemization of environmentalism may be identi-
fied readily. The Endangered Species Act (ESA), once the proto-
type of uncompromising roadblock environmentalism, now rele-
gates the fates of dwindling lifeforms to a political committee. 0
The Clean Air Act (CAA) borrows from a financial model, auc-
tioning transferable allowances to emit sulfur dioxide like stock
market commodities." CERCLA, which once shunned fairness
in favor of cleanup, now places a potentially heightened burden
on government plaintiffs to allocate cleanup costs among defen-
dants, rather than relying on joint and several liability to rest
the burden of apportioning cleanup costs on the shoulders of
those defendants easiest to identify or best able to pay. 2 Per-
haps the most prominent symbol that environmentalism is
evolving into just another facet of mainstream American politics
is the Clinton administration's effort, albeit thus far not fully
achieved, to "elevate" the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) Administrator to Executive Cabinet status. 3
Under former EPA Administrator William K. Reilly, EPA might
have been described as a "quasi-independent" executive agen-
cy.14 One can only wonder what kind of turn the United States
first flip-flop, to use a politics-as-usual term." Id. The article cites John Rensenbrick,
a Bowdoin College political science professor who founded Maine's Green Party, as
arguing that the Greens are not leftist and that they enjoy five-percent support
among Republicans. Id.
10. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (1988) (establishing the Endan-
gered Species Committee, an executive branch committee authorized to grant exemp-
tions from the Act's general prohibition of government projects likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of an endangered or threatened species or result in the de-
struction or adverse modification of a habitat of such a species).
11. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (Supp. V 1993); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 73
(1994) (implementing 42 U.S.C. § 7651).
12. See H.R. 4916, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 413 (1994) (making the United States
Environmental Protection Agency responsible both for identifying parties eligible for
expedited settlement and for allocating cost liability earlier and more frequently).
Presently, CERCLA does not specify whether liability is to be joint and several or
apportioned. Courts have concluded, however, that CERCLA permits joint and sever-
al liability, but that liability may be apportioned where appropriate. See, e.g., United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
13. See 140 CONG. REC. H171-73 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1994) (debating H.R. 3425).
The effort has stalled over, among other issues, the question of whether the bill
creating the Department of the Environment should be amended to create a right of
citizens to demand compensation when environmental regulation results in a taking
of private property. See, e.g., id. at H178 (statement of Rep. Merger).
14. See, e.g., One Last Attack on Wetlands, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 15,
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environmental program would take under a president with a
strong laissez-faire agenda, who would exercise the same degree
of control over the nation's chief environmental administrator as
he would exercise over a member of the Cabinet.15
The question remains, however, whether the evolution of
American environmentalism toward mainstream law and politics
fatally compromises its essential ideals and, if it does, whether a
shift toward the mainstream is essential for environmentalism's
survival as an important political subject. 6 Perhaps no social
cause is able to maintain the pure standards of the challenger in
the long term.' Undeniably, environmental law has enjoyed a
healthy political coalescence, fusing scattered statutes and com-
mon-law causes of action addressing nature-often with their
primary focus on regulating navigation and sea-harvesting or
protecting public health and safety-into the present regime of
sternly administered and stunningly expensive cleanup laws.
The future will show whether environmental law will develop a
law and government structure that not only considers, but is
based upon, the long-term survival of the ecosystem or whether
the American conscience and pocketbook have reached their
political saturation point for environmental responsibility.'"
1992, at 2B ("Mr. Reilly, a true environmentalist in an administration that is callous
on such issues ... has a history within the Bush administration of being more
favorable toward the environment than Mr. Quayle and other conservatives.").
15. See S. 533, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991). The Department of the Environment
Act of 1991, proposed during George Bush's presidency, would have elevated the
Environmental Protection Agency to Cabinet level.
16. See, e.g., Scott Allen, Murky Times for Environmentalism-Economy, Crime
Overtake What Was To Be Cause of '90s, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1994, at 1
(quoting John Clarke, director of advocacy at the Massachusetts Audobon Society,
who observed that "[w]e peaked with the recelebration of Earth Day").
17. Id. at 28 (noting how environmentalism is the victim of its own success, both
by achieving initial victories that lull the population into considering environmental
problems resolved and by spawning organized foes, such as the "Wise Use" move-
ment); see also Robert Braile, What the Hell Are We Fighting For?, GARBAGE, Fall
1994, at 28, reprinted in Blowin' in the Wind, UTNE READER, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 83
(describing "an embattled movement" struggling "to articulate a vision of sustainable
environmentalism").
18. The future of environmentalism may lie in the success or failure of the "Con-
tract with America," which makes no mention of environmental issues, but which is
fiercely antiregulation and presents a grave risk to environmentally protective federal
programs. See, e.g., H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (The Risk Assessment
1996] 385
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Perhaps the environmentalist, like the cautious feminist who is
forever gauging the position of women's issues on the ever-re-
volving popular cycle of pro- then anti-feminism, must focus on
the national tolerance for the once nonexistent and now ubiqui-
tous cause of environmentalism and realize that the threat of
major backlash necessitates some efforts to establish roots in
mainstream politics, even if such efforts require a compromise of
principles. 9
From this perspective, a single political or legislative develop-
ment might simultaneously represent both a step away from the
ideals of environmentalism and a step toward securing a perma-
nent place for environmental issues in American politics. An
example of this compromise between idealism and pragmatism
is the developing law of natural resource damages (NRD).2°
While NRD law may sacrifice some of the breadth and power of
and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995); see also Scott Allen, 'Contract' Reframes Issue of
Environment's Worth, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 25 (describing "the biggest
environmental battle in Washington since the early years of the Reagan era"); Jill
Zuckman, 50 Days Are a Breeze for House GOP, But Storms Are Predicted, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1995, at 8 (reviewing the more politically sensitive "Contract" issues).
19. Cf. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
xviii, xxi-xxii (1992). Faludi's explanation of the political backlash against feminism
might equally describe the present political climate against environmentalism:
The backlash is at once sophisticated and banal, deceptively "progressive"
and proudly backward. It deploys both the "new" findings of "scientific re-
search" and the dime-store moralism of yesteryear; it turns into media
sound bites both the glib pronouncements of pop-psych trend-watchers
and the frenzied rhetoric of New Right preachers.
The force and furor of the backlash churn beneath the surface, largely
invisible to the public eye....
The backlash is not a conspiracy, with a council dispatching agents
from some central control room .... For the most part, its workings are
encoded and internalized, diffuse and chameleonic. Not all of the manifes-
tations of the backlash are of equal weight or significance either; some
are mere ephemera, generated by a culture machine that is always
scrounging for a "fresh" angle.
Although the backlash is not an organized movement, that doesn't make
it any less destructive. In fact, the lack of orchestration, the absence of a
single string-puller, only makes it harder to see-and perhaps more effec-
tive.
Id. at xviii-xxii.
20. See infra part III.
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certain other environmental liability schemes, it also nudges the
law forward, toward systemized recognition of heretofore unac-
knowledged environmental values and ideals.
Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater has coined the term "the Ra-
chel Carson Paradigm" to describe an environmentalist perspec-
tive that attained popular status in the early sixties, in part
through the influential writing of Rachel Carson.2 In Silent
Spring, Carson explained how decisions involving chemical ap-
plications to the environment necessitate consideration of longer
term and broader ranging effects than the effects traditionally
considered under the laissez-faire economic cost-benefit model
generally utilized in a free market systemY More broadly,
however, Carson's work evokes the type of moral thinking that
transcends both law and economicsY Her discourse takes heed
of the perspectives of the aesthete and the scientist to arrive at
a logical synthesis of concerns and goals, free of law and politics,
that serves as the best widely read example of true environmen-
talist thinking available today.24 For these reasons, Rachel
21. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms:
A Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994).
Although Plater's Paradigm might be termed an "environmentalist perspective" be-
cause it is a perspective that is essential to environmentalist thinking and is aptly
symbolized by Carson, the paradigm Plater identifies is more accurately described as
a sociopolitical state of mind that takes a broader and longer-ranging account of
nonmarket consequences flowing from human activities. See infr-a notes 30-34, 305
and accompanying text.
22. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
23. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 8 (Rachel Carson "had the broad view of the ecol-
ogist who studies the infinitely complex web of relationships between living things
and their environment."); see CAROL B. GARTNER, RACHEL CARSON 102 (1983).
[Silent Spring] is a highly political book, urging profound reorientation of
beliefs, attitudes, and practices on the part of both governments and the
public. Such sweeping reassessment threatened the economic interests of
powerful corporations and all those they supported in industry, govern-
ment agencies, and universities. It could and did lead to governmental
actions to control the use of pesticides.
Id.
24. See GARTNER, supra note 23, at 124-25.
People have put Rachel Carson into many categories-among them, poet,
scientist, conservationist-but these were not separate identities for her.
Just as the concept of ecological interrelationships was a cornerstone of
her philosophy, so her organizing principle was integration ....
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Carson's philosophy is the prototype against which trends in
environmental law and politics should be measured to assess our
progress along the evolutionary continuum toward a true envi-
ronmentalist perspective.
NRD restoration is a concept codified in CERCLA from its
inception.' In essence, the NRD provisions of CERCLA hold
CERCLA defendants liable for the injuries to flora, fauna, and
other aspects of nature that are not fully addressed under exist-
ing cleanup provisions." NRD also allows the law to account
for the lost enjoyment and other lost uses of natural resources
that humans suffer due to pollution and the time necessary to
clean up pollution." Even in this brief sketch of NRD, one may
discern that the law of NRD conceivably could stand as a signifi-
cant example of law constructed in the mode of the Rachel Car-
son Paradigm. NRD law has direct and real potential to trans-
late into financial liabilities the long-term, broad ranging, and
aesthetic effects of human activities on nature.
During 1994, two agencies charged with the responsibility of
implementing the NRD provisions of several major federal envi-
ronmental statutes published final and draft rules addressing
NRD implementation.' This Article examines those NRD pro-
grams and certain major legal battles that have emerged in the
NRD area. Ultimately, this Article focuses on what the develop-
ment of NRD law indicates about United States progress toward
a fuller assimilation and adoption of Rachel Carson's environ-
[As she stated,] "the more clearly we can focus our attention on the
wonders and realities of the universe about us the less taste we shall
have for the destruction of our race."
Id. (quoting Rachel L. Carson, Design for Nature Writing, Remarks Made on Accep-
tance of the John Burroughs Medal (Apr. 7, 1952)) (transcript in the Rachel Carson
papers, Rachel Carson Council (formerly Rachel Carson Trust for the Living Environ-
ment), Washington, D.C.)).
25. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 173, 276 and accompanying text.
28. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,262-88 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (stat-
ing the Department of the Interior's final rule implementing NED under CERCLA
and the Clean Water Act); 60 Fed. Reg. 39,804 (1995) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
pt. 990) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995) (proposing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's (NOAA) rule for implementing NRD under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA)); see infra notes 169, 212 and accompanying text.
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mental philosophy.
Part H of this Article presents the Author's view of Carson's
philosophy, utilizing the Rachel Carson Paradigm as the motiva-
tion for an examination of Carson's works. Part II identifies
three primary philosophical concepts that Carson stressed in her
writing: her belief that people have a right to live unassaulted
by toxins; her belief that maintaining a diverse web of life is the
key to ecological survival; and her belief that environmental
preservation is a moral human instinct. Part II then engages in
a general survey of how and where certain principles of Carson's
philosophy are either reflected or rejected in modern environ-
mental law.
Part III presents an overview of NRD law, primarily through
a brief sketch of the modern law of NRD as reflected in
CERCLA and the efforts of the Department of the Interior (DOI)
to craft NRD regulations implementing the CERCLA NRD cause
of action.
Part IV engages in an analysis of where NRD law reflects the
various aspects of Carson's philosophy identified in Part II, and
where NRD law falls short or retreats from environmental
achievements in other laws. Part IV determines that NRD repre-
sents progress toward environmental thinking as idealized by
Carson, while also evidencing a significant amount of renewed
sensitivity toward some very non-Carsonian legal ideas. The
result is an area of law that moves forward conceptually while
imposing on itself procedural legal constraints that are not char-
acteristic of environmental law in general.
Part V reprises Professor Plater's Rachel Carson Paradigm,
discusses his ultimate theory that environmentalists must main-
tain the stance of political system challengers, and agrees that
maintaining the adversarial posture Carson assumed in Silent
Spring may be essential in spite of our efforts to protect the
environment within the political-economic system. This Article
concludes that NRD developments, when combined with other
legislative, judicial, and political incidents, may indicate signs of
a backlash against Carson's form of environmentalism, but that
the mainstreaming and compromising of environmental ideals in
American law and politics does not relegate Rachel Carson's
philosophy to the graveyard of lost ideals.
1996] 389
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II. RACHEL CARSON'S PHILOSOPHY: PLATER'S
PARADIGM EXPLORED
[We live in] an era dominated by industry, in which the right
to make a dollar at whatever cost is seldom challenged.29
As Professor Plater has observed, in Silent Spring Rachel
Carson advocates that decisionmakers work to identify environ-
mental effects of decisions that are latent, or external to market-
based analysis, and to "take comprehensive account of the real,
interacting consequences ... of decisions."" Professor Plater's
image is accurate if not lyric, as part of its power lies in the fact
that it is so readily grasped by anyone who has dipped, even
cursorily, into Silent Spring. Plater's Rachel Carson Paradigm
also provides a model against which environmentally related
behavior, including laws and their interpretation, may be
gauged. A more environmentally sound law or policy would ad-
here to the Paradigm by internalizing externalities, forcing hu-
man actors to take into account the continuing, long-term conse-
quences of their actions. 1
Plater's leading example of a law embracing the Paradigm, and
perhaps the clearest example of a federal law that internalizes
environmental impacts into cost-benefit decisionmaking, is the
29. CARSON, supra note 22, at 13.
30. Plater, supra note 21, at 982, 989-90, 998-1000. Plater refers to this as "ex-
panded accountings" and "Carson-style accountings" and writes that "Rachel Carson
spread a broad intellectual catch-basket beneath the Coasian welfare economists'
universe of benefit-maximizing individual actors, so as to collect and take overall ac-
count of their jettisoned 'externalized' social costs, even if they are indirect and
unmarketized." Id. at 998.
31. This Article briefly considers whether environmental law internalizes
externalities. The subject of environmental law as a means of internalizing
externalities is handled thoroughly, and certainly as well as this Author could hope
to handle it, by Plater. See Plater, supra note 21. By casting environmental damages
as external costs, economic cost-benefit analyses arrive at decisions that cause envi-
ronental harms and ultimately prove unwise, even in economic terms. As Professor
Plater points out, environmental laws, with their regulatory costs and costly liability
schemes, bring environmental considerations into the cost-benefit analysis process,
thus internalizing to commercial decisionmakers harms to the environment or at
least partially harmonizing economic decisionmaking and environmental degradation
resulting from human activities. Id. at 988-89.
390
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National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)" Introduced in
1969 as the first of the major modern environmental statutes,
NEPA imposes an obligation on federal government actors to
consider the effects of their major actions on the natural envi-
ronment.' NEPA thus serves as a direct and simple translation
of the economic facet of the Rachel Carson Paradigm into law.
Subsequent judicial interpretations limiting the scope and effect
of NEPA, however, illustrate the political shift away from the
Paradigm.34
Silent Spring is more than a manifesto for the internalization
of externalities. In Silent Spring, and in her writing in general,
Carson advocates far more than the expansion of cost-benefit
analysis to incorporate environmental impacts of private ac-
tions. 5 Indeed, Carson's writing reveals a number of philosoph-
ical principles-truths to Carson-that are integral to some of
the more familiar, controversial, and unique features of modern
environmental law. Although Carson's writings do not focus on
law, her studies of the effects of pesticides on soil, aquatic and
coastal ecosystems, and various lifeforms provide food for
thought about how legal concepts such as fault, retroactivity,
and causation are best utilized in an environmentally conscious
world.
This section explores Carson's works to identify elements of
her paradigmatic perspective that define environmentalism, and
against which current environmental law may be gauged. The
first of Carson's philosophical truths discussed below is her
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Plater, supra note 21, at
989. Plater counts 34 statutes passed within three years of NEPA's passage that
"wittingly or unwittingly reflected Rachel Carson's teachings, addressing ecological
and economic values and problems that had not been acknowledged or had been
inadequately accounted for in previous public and private laws." Id. at 1002-03.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
34. See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228
(1980) ("In the present litigation there is no doubt that [the government actor] con-
sidered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed
site for low-income housing. NEPA requires no more.").
35. This Article in no way intends to argue or imply that Professor Plater has
failed to accurately or completely define Rachel Carson's contributions to environ-
mentalism. In fact, this further exploration of Carson's philosophy and its application
to law is solely and fully derived from the Paradigm as devised by Plater. See
Plater, supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra note 305 and accompanying text.
1996]
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belief that humans have the right to an environment free from
private or government applications of life- and habitat-threaten-
ing toxins. 6 A second conviction expressed in Carson's writing
is that the responsibility of environmentalism and ultimate
savior of a healthy earth is the preservation and maintenance of
varied and well-dispersed biological species and habitats.17 Ele-
mental to this conviction is Carson's awareness of the intercon-
nectedness of all the elements of Earth's ecosystem. The third of
Carson's philosophical themes discussed below is her belief that
humans bear a moral, emotional, naturally evoked instinct to
preserve nature simply because nature exists. 8
A. The Right To Live Unpoisoned
If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantee that a citizen shall
be secure against lethal poisons distributed either by private
individuals or by public officials, it is surely only because our
forefathers.., could conceive of no such problem.9
Carson believed that persons have the right to live in an envi-
ronment that has not been polluted by the purposeful acts of
others. In both her spoken communications and in her writing,
she tended to express this belief in simple, firm language and
voice, perhaps ingenuous in her use of the term "rights" without
a reference to law and perhaps more assured in her ability to
make a statement without the crutch of a footnote.0 Through-
out Silent Spring, in which Carson advocates her scientific views
in an adversarial manner reminiscent of legal writing, she ar-
gues for a human right to live unassaulted by chemicals. 1
36. See infra parts II.A.1, II.A.3.
37. See infra part 1I.B.1.
38. See infra part 1.C.1.
39. CARSON, supra note 22, at 12-13.
40. Indeed, Carson was acutely aware that the right to a toxin-free environment
bore no support from the law. During the Senate Hearings on pesticide use, spon-
sored by Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, Carson stated, "I speak not as a
lawyer, but as a biologist and as a human being, but I strongly feel that [the right
of the citizen to be secure in his own home against the intrusion of poisons applied
by other persons] is or should be one of the basic human rights." American Experi-
ence (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 8, 1993) (transcript No. 511, at 16).
41. CARSON, supra note 22, at 12-13. Carson uses the terminology of legal advo-
392 [Vol. 37:381
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The law offers no easily identified support for Carson's asser-
tions regarding the right to live without pollutants. No express
right to a clean environment appears in the Constitution,42 nor
have any of the rights associated with personal privacy and
property been interpreted to advance an absolute right to live in
an unpolluted environment. 3 Instead, the constitutional au-
thority to regulate the environment has been recognized primar-
ily, and rather unphilosophically, through the Commerce
Clause.44 While the Commerce Clause is arguably a logical
foundation for environmental law because of the need for uni-
formity in environmental regulation and the fact that the regu-
lated community is comprised primarily of players in interstate
commerce, the fact that environmental law has its genesis in the
Commerce Clause provides no legal support for Carson's philo-
sophical view that people have a basic right to live a life free of
the purposeful governmental intrusion of toxins. Indeed, a per-
cacy as well, ending one chapter with several statements of her position on pesticide
applications that begin, "I contend." Id. In a chapter cataloging the history of the
haphazard destruction humans have visited on nature, Carson presents the argu-
ments of conservationists and government agencies as if to a jury and identifies
members of society who have been denied a "legitimate right" to access nature due
to the application of pesticides. Id. at 86.
42. Courts have rejected arguments that the Ninth Amendment offers a constitu-
tional basis for the right to a clean environment. See, e.g., Tanner v. Armco Steel
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (holding that "[tihe Ninth Amendment,
through its 'penumbra' or otherwise, embodies no legally assertable right to a health-
ful environment").
43. Indeed, the property right against intrusive regulation without compensation,
found in the Constitution's Taking Clauses, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, has
emerged as a formidable weapon against environmental regulation affecting private
property. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
44. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
282"(1981) (holding that the Commerce Clause is broad enough to permit congres-
sional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution); United States v. Union
Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that Congress has power under
the Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity against
lawsuits under CERCLA), affd sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1329 (6th Cir.
1974) (holding that, through its interstate commerce powers, Congress may prohibit
discharge of pollutants into non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams); Wickland
Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 955, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
Congress can abolish the states' immunity when exercising its authority under the
Commerce Clause).
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ceived connection between interstate commerce and environmen-
tal regulations may be at work in certain landmark environmen-
tal law cases that prohibit parties suffering from pollution from
using the common law of nuisance to combat pollution sourc-
es.45 The constitutional foundation of environmental law thus
may actually serve as a weapon against Carson's perceived right
to a clean environment.46
1. Carson's Ideal: A Property Right in a Nontoxic
Environment
Carson was not ignorant of the law's inadequate support of
those who would save the environment from chemical poisoning.
In Silent Spring, Carson refers to Murphy v. Benson,47 an ac-
tion, in which Carson played a role, that was brought against
government pesticide sprayers in New York. The dispute in-
volved a United States Department of Agriculture Plant Pest
Control Division program to blanket spray dichloro-diphenyl-
trichloro-ethane (DDT) diluted with fuel oil over several million
acres of United States land per year, with the goal of "eradicat-
ing" the gypsy moth.4" Ornithologist Robert Cushman Murphy
led a group of Long Island citizens in an attempt to obtain a
court injunction against the spraying of their land. The citizens
claimed infringements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution for the deprivation of property,
and possibly lives, without due process, the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation, and the tor-
tious and illegal trespassing upon the persons and property of
45. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). In denying
the plaintiffs' right to apply Vermont nuisance law to a New York pulp and paper
mill regulated under the CWA, id. at 497, the Court revealed a high level of sensi-
tivity to the commercial industry's need for efficiency and predictability in the regu-
latory standards that apply to its discharge of waste into interstate waterways and
less sensitivity to the environmental problems suffered by downstream receptors.
46. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992) (examining whether
an upstream state and the EPA had complied with the CWA permit process before
allowing wastewater discharges that were the source of downstream state's water
pollution problems).
47. 151 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), vacated as nwot in part, affd in part, 270
F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 929 (1960).
48. CARSON, supra note 22, at 157.
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the plaintiffs in a manner causing irreparable damage.49
Although Carson would later describe the case as having been
lost on a technicality, ° the district court claimed to base its
denial of the injunction against spraying on a balanced review of
affidavits submitted to the court in which "the plaintiffs have
not presented persuasive evidence that the threat of irreparable
damage to them is in excess of that which would probably be
visited upon the community in general, if a temporary injunction
were to be granted as sought.""1 The court's tone is significant
to our examination of the law's effectiveness in protecting an
individual's right to a chemical-free existence. The court ex-
pressed respect for the plaintiffs' grievance, characterizing it as
being "of such a nature that full and complete opportunity must
be afforded to them to establish by legal evidence the existence
of the conditions of which they complain."52 Yet, the court found
that the irreparable threat DDT posed to the plaintiffs' health
and organic farming operations did not constitute sufficient
evidence of trespass or any other property right infringement to
warrant a temporary injunction.53
Justice William 0. Douglas, whose view of the law's place in
protecting the environment is quoted often by Carson,54 dis-
49. Murphy, 151 F. Supp. at 789.
50. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 239. Carson was undoubtedly referring to the court
of appeals decision to dismiss as moot the action for a permanent injunction. See
Murphy v. Benson, 270 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 929
(1960).
51. Murphy, 151 F. Supp. at 792.
52. Id. at 789.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., CARSON, supra note 22, at 72. Carson relates a story in which Jus-
tice Douglas attended a meeting of federal officials discussing protests against the
programmatic destruction of sagebrush.
These men considered it hilariously funny that an old lady had "opposed
the plan because the wild flowers would be destroyed.
Yet was not her right to search out a painted cup or a tiger lily as
inalienable as the right of stockmen to search out grass or of a lumber-
man to claim a tree?" asks this humane and perceptive jurist. "The aes-
thetic values of the wilderness are as much our inheritance as the veins
of copper and coal in our hills and the forests in our mountains."
Id. (citing WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, MY WILDERNESS: THE PACIFIC WEST 160 (1960)).
The admiration was mutual. See BROOKS, supra note 1, at xi-xii (quoting Justice
William 0. Douglas as predicting that Silent Spring would become "the most impor-
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sented from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Murphy
v. Butler.55 He drew from the facts of Murphy a number of tra-
ditional-sounding claims of property infringements, citing evi-
dence of a dairy from which milk contaminated by pesticides
could not meet federal and state regulations, several instances of
vegetable and fruit produced for consumption or sale having
been rendered inedible, and instances of fish owned by petition-
ers having been killed.56 Moreover, Justice Douglas cited effects
of spraying not linked to direct property claims, such as the
killing of birds and predatory insects. He urged the Supreme
Court to hear the Murphy appeal, thus indicating that he be-
lieved that law may be used to protect more than just the envi-
ronment over which a plaintiff is able to establish a private
property interest.57 The fact that Justice Douglas's strongly
stated pro-environment sentiments were published in a dis-
sent-indeed, a dissent to a denial of certiorari-may have
helped Carson to understand that her perceived right to live
unbombarded by toxic chemicals had no firm foundation in law
in the early 1960s.
2. The Law's Response to Carson's Ideal: Citizens' Suits and
the Rise of Takings Cases
The legal generation since Carson's death has responded with
mixed sentiments to her ideal that American citizens have a
legal right to be secure against indiscriminate releases of lethal
poisons into the environment. In 1971, the Supreme Court legiti-
mized the citizen's role in policing administrative decisions af-
fecting the environment, holding that a group of private citizens
was entitled to judicial review of the United States Secretary of
Transportation's authorization of a highway project that was to
pass through a park.5" In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Sierra
tant chronicle of this century for the human race").
55. 362 U.S. 929, 929 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 930-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-16
(1971). Possibly more significant than the preservation of the particular park for
purposes of detecting Rachel Carson's environmental rights is the Court's reading of
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
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Club v. Morton,59 stated that the Sierra Club had no standing
to challenge government actions that allegedly threatened the
natural integrity of Mineral King Valley, part of the Sierra Ne-
vada Mountains." The Court did, however, indicate that a
member of the Sierra Club claiming a personal injury might
assert before a court interests of the general public that support-
ed the member's claim.61 The Court also acknowledged that an
injury to the aesthetic and ecological interests of a plaintiff was
as legally cognizable as an economic injury.62 In spite of Justice
Douglas's dissent to the decision,63 Sierra Club may nonethe-
less be characterized as an environmentally sensitive opinion
that adheres to the teachings of Carson, who urges us to recog-
nize the often inarticulable, often personal value of nature's
beauty.64
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988), as allowing the reviewing court to engage in "a thorough,
probing, in-depth review" of agency decisionmaking. Id. at 413-15.
59. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
60. Id. at 73541.
61. Id. at 740 n.15.
62. Id. at 734.
63. Id. at 741. In his dissent, Justice Douglas advocated, perhaps more wistfully
than adversarially, that the law fashion
a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before
federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and
where injury is the sulject of public outrage. Contemporary public con-
cern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the
conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own
preservation.
Id. at 74142 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referencing Christopher D. Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
450 (1972)).
Justice Blackmun, in his own dissent, advocated that organizations like the
Sierra Club, that "possessed . . . pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes
and purposes in the area of environment" be permitted standing in environmental
cases. Id. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. In response to the Sierra Club's allegation that a proposed road through the
Sequoia National Park "would destroy or otherwise adversely affect the scenery,
natural and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoy-
ment of the park for future generations," the Court wrote that "[alesthetic and
environmental well-being . . . are important ingredients of the quality of life in
our society." Id. at 734. This passage may have been inspired by a passage from
Carson's Silent Spring:
I know well a stretch of road where nature's own landscaping has
provided a border of alder, viburnum, sweet fern, and juniper with sea-
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Standing to assert the interests of the environment enjoyed a
degree of success after the Sierra Club decision."5 More signifi-
cantly, Congress inserted into the major federal environmental
statutes express grants of standing, enabling citizens to bring
actions to enforce the statutes' directives."6  In addition,
CERCLA provides for public participation in the cleanup plan
development process 7 and also for a private cause of action
that in many ways parallels the government suit authorized
sonally changing accents of bright flowers, or of fruits hanging in jeweled
clusters in the fall. . . .But the [herbicide] sprayers took over and the
miles along that road became something to be traversed quickly ....
But here and there authority had somehow faltered and by an unac-
countable oversight there were oases of beauty in the midst of austere
and regimented control-oases that made the desecration of the greater
part of the road the more unbearable. In such places my spirit lifted to
the sight of the drifts of white clover or the clouds of purple vetch with
here and there the flaming cup of a wood lily.
CARSON, supra note 22, at 71.
65. The Supreme Court made its most elastic use of the dicta in Sierra Club in
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973), in which the Court found that "an identifiable trifle [of a percepti-
ble personal injury to the plaintiff] is enough for standing to fight out a question of
principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motiva-
tion." Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Kenneth C. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)).
66. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (requiring a plaintiff to
allege that he or she was "adversely affected" by the illegal discharge); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (allowing a person to sue for enforce-
ment of "an emission standard or limitation" or to "allege a violation of a specific
strategy or commitment in the [State Implementation Plan]"); Wilder v. Thomas, 659
F. Supp. 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) (allowing any person to commence a
civil action against any person alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order" issued under the Act, or
against any person "who has contributed or who is contributing to te past or pres-
ent handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health
of the environment"); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986 (EPCRKA), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1988) (allowing a citizen to bring suit for a
variety of disclosure violations).
Interestingly, NEPA does not provide a statutory basis for citizens to litigate
government adherence to its environmental review process requirements. It does,
however, acknowledge the contribution public and private organizations make toward
"creat[ing] and maintain[ing] conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988).
67. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(k)(2), 9617, 9622(d)(2) (1988).
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under the statute."
Finally, it is worth noting that traditional common-law causes
of action, including nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict lia-
bility for abnormally dangerous activities, are actions under
which private citizens may assert personal rights to live
unassaulted by the toxins of technology.69 Although these caus-
es of action generally do not promise the wholesale relief envi-
ronmentalist plaintiffs desire, they do reflect Carson's ideal that
individuals bear the right to combat pollution."
Thus, we may discern progress in the last thirty years toward
the Carson ideal that private citizens have legal rights to control
their contact with toxins. Recently, however, signs of a severe
judicial backlash against the right of an individual to assert
ecological grievances may be discerned. In 1990, and again in
1992, Justice Scalia delivered Supreme Court opinions that
grossly reduced citizens' power to establish standing in environ-
mental cases. 1
68. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Arguably, the private plaintiff faces a greater burden of
proof than does the government plaintiff. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848 (1987).
69. Most federal environmental law statutes include savings provisions to avoid
preempting these property-based environmental rights actions. See, e.g., CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (1988); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988); CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7459 (1988).
70. The savings provisions, however, may be severely curtailed by the courts. See,
e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
71. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), the Court held
that the individual plaintiffs had not established that they were personally injured
by government actions when the plaintiffs made recreational use of land in the vi-
cinity of land the federal government opened to mining claims and oil and gas leas-
es. Id. at 889. The Court concluded that individuals "cannot seek wholesale im-
provement of [treatment of the environment] by court decree, rather than in the
offices of [an agency] or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements
are normally made." Id. at 891. In his dissent, however, Justice Blackmun asserted
that "a single plaintiff, so long as he is injured by [an agency rule of broad applica-
bility], may obtain 'programmatic' relief that affects the rights of parties not before
the court." Id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), again under the rubric
of upholding the separation of legislative and judicial powers, the Court denied the
plaintiffs standing to challenge a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior
interpreting the scope of his regulatory duties under the ESA. The plaintiffs claimed
that the government action jeopardized species of crocodile, elephant, and leopard,
identifying as their personal injuries imprecise plans to revisit foreign lands to ob-
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Perhaps more significantly, the property rights arguments
supported by Carson in Murphy have lashed back against those
who would regulate private property in the name of environ-
mental preservation. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cil 2  and again in Dolan v. City of Tigard," the Supreme
Court found that regulatory actions designed to protect or pro-
mote a healthy environment that have the collateral effect of
restricting the amount of profit a landowner is able to extract
from his or her property constituted takings of property necessi-
tating compensation.74
serve the species. Id. at 562-63. The Court concluded that these harms were not
imminent or precise enough to establish standing. Id. at 563-64. The implication that
the grievances lacked urgency underscores the vulnerability of the standing game
environmental plaintiffs must play. The true injury the plaintiffs hoped to ad-
dress-preventing the potential extinction of the named species-did not lack urgen-
cy. The Court's refusal to incorporate this greater concern into its analysis of the
standing question largely eviscerated the invitations in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 740 n.15 (1972), and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973), for plaintiffs to bring
questions of public concern to a court by establishing a related personal injury.
There may still be hope, however, as indicated by the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
standing in individual plaintiffs' asserting injury due to inadequacy of agency adher-
ence to NEPA), indicating that issues of public concern may not be entirely outside
the realm of personal standing.
72. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
73. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
74. In Lucas, the Court limited the regulatory authority of government to control
private property use without compensation to regulatory controls based on "back-
ground principles" of property and nuisance law. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010. In short,
the Court prioritized historical notions of private property interests over modern
scientific understanding of the environmental impact of private property development.
In Dolan, the Court scrutinized the manner of regulation, finding that hardship to
the private property owner must bear a "rough proportionality" to the environmental
impact of the landowner's proposed development. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20. For a
reading of Lucas limiting its takings test to government regulation that renders a
landowner's property valueless, see Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 46
(Mass. 1992). In Wilson, the Massachusetts regulatory process prohibited the land-
owner from building a sea wall in time to prevent his shorefront house from suc-
cumbing to the sea. Id. at 44. The court found that it was the wave that had de-
stroyed the value of Wilson's property, and not the regulation of his right to develop.
Id. at 46.
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3. Carson's Ideal: A Right to Information About Government
Action Affecting the Environment
Essential to Carson's advocation of a right to live unassailed
by pollutants is her belief that individuals must be provided
information about toxins in the environment in order to make
knowledgeable decisions about whether to accept or combat
government or commercial decisions and actions.75 In Silent
Spring, she relates numerous historical scenarios to establish
how the use of chemicals to eradicate a perceived problem has
often led to unanticipated results, such as the proliferation of
the intended victims or some other unanticipated environmental
tragedy that dwarfs the intended positive goal.76 Carson does
not trumpet her conclusions as to why humankind repeatedly
engages in fools' missions against insect and plant pests miscast
as monsters and how our misunderstanding and misuse of chem-
icals causes great and unintended harm to the earth, but she
does identify a number of human misperceptions that account
for such errors.
One human flaw Carson identifies is the attraction to short-
term fixes, a propensity that encourages short-sighted and ill-
informed decisionmaking.77 In addition, she points out that
when we do engage in study, we rely on private sector industries
with profit goals to fund scientific research about the effects and
effectiveness of chemical solutions to environmental problems.7"
75. CARSON, supra note 22, at 13 ("The obligation to endure gives us the right to
know.") (quoting Jean Rostand).
76. Id. at 43-44 (relating the story of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where the
production of insecticides led to widespread disease among livestock and crops miles
from the plant, even though the form of contamination found in the environment
had never been manufactured at the plant, but had been spawned spontaneously
from a mix of discharged chemicals subject to air, water and sunlight).
77. Id. at 68-69. Carson identifies chemical weed killers as
a bright new toy .... [Tihey give a giddy sense of power over nature to
those who wield them, and as for the long-range and less obvious ef-
fects-these are easily brushed aside as the baseless imaginings of pessi-
mists. The "agricultural engineers" speak blithely of "chemical plowing" in
a world that is urging to beat its plowshares into spray guns. The town
fathers of a thousand communities lend willing ears to the chemical
salesman and the eager contractors who will rid the roadsides of
"brush"-for a price. It is cheaper than mowing, is the cry.
Id.
78. Id. at 258-59.
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Indeed, Carson even identifies situations in which we allow pri-
vate industry to influence our perception of which natural phe-
nomena constitute problems for us and warrant our interfer-
ence.79 Carson indicates that due to these and other influences,
we have a high, emotionally fed propensity to underestimate the
dangers presented by synthesized chemicals." This, in turn,
lulls us into misusing chemicals and allows us to apply chemi-
cals without concern as to their detrimental effects."'
In one interview, Carson stated that her purpose in writing
Silent Spring was to remedy the imbalance of information avail-
able to the public about the benefits and hazards of pesti-
cides.82 Indeed, a recurring theme of Silent Spring is that sup-
The major chemical companies are pouring money into the universities to
support research on insecticides. This creates attractive fellowships for
graduate students and attractive staff positions. Biological-control studies,
on the other hand, are never so endowed-for the simple reason that
they do not promise anyone the fortunes that are to be made in the
chemical industry. . . . This situation also explains the otherwise mystify-
ing fact that certain outstanding entomologists are among the leading
advocates of chemical control.
Id.
79. Id. at 176.
Gardening is now firmly linked with the super poisons. Every hard-
ware store, garden-supply shop, and supermarket has rows of insecticides
for every conceivable horticultural situation. Those who fail to make wide
use of this array of lethal sprays and dusts are by implication remiss, for
almost every newspaper's garden page and the majority of the gardening
magazines take their use for granted.
Id.
80. Id. at 174.
If a huge skull and crossbones were suspended above the insecticide
department the customer might at least enter it with the respect normal-
ly accorded death-dealing materials. But instead the display is homey
and cheerfiil, and, with the pickles and olives across the aisle and the
bath and laundry soaps adjoining, the rows upon rows of insecticides are
displayed.
Id.
81. Id. ("Lulled by the soft sell and the hidden persuader, the average citizen is
seldom aware of the deadly materials with which he is surrounding himself: indeed,
he may not realize he is using them at all.").
82. See American Experience, supra note 40 (transcript No. 551, at 15).
We have heard the benefits of pesticides. We have heard a great deal
about their safety, but very little about the hazards, very little about the
failures, the inefficiencies. And yet, the public was being asked to accept
these chemicals, was being asked to acquiesce in their use and did not
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port for pesticide spraying, when not motivated by profit, is
illogical, and can only be the product of ignorance about the
ineffectiveness and detrimental side effects of spraying. 3 Car-
son explains that DDT is ineffective against its insect victims,
which have displayed an uncanny biological ability to adapt to
the poisons that humans apply toward their eradication.84 Si-
lent Spring also .explains that DDT kills off the natural preda-
tors of its intended victims, resulting in a greater pest popula-
tion with no natural controls.85 Carson sets forth the toxic side
have the whole picture, so I set about to remedy the balance there.
Id.
83. CARSON, supra note 22, at 13.
There is still very limited awareness of the nature of the threat.
This is an era of specialists, each of whom sees his own problem and is
unaware of or intolerant of the larger frame into which it fits. It is also
an era dominated by industry, in which the right to make a dollar at
whatever cost is seldom challenged. When the public protests, confronted
with some obvious evidence of damaging results of pesticide applications,
it is fed little tranquilizing pills of half truth. We urgently need an end
to these false assurances, to the sugar coating of unpalatable facts.
Id.
84. Id. at 8.
The whole process of spraying seems caught up in an endless spiral.
Since DDT was released for civilian use, a process of escalation has been
going on in which ever more toxic material must be found. This has hap-
pened because insects, in a triumphant vindication of Darwin's principle
of the survival of the fittest, have evolved super races immune to the
particular insecticide used, hence a deadlier one has always to be devel-
oped-and then a deadlier one than that. It has happened also be-
cause ... destructive insects often undergo a "flareback," or resurgence,
after spraying, in numbers greater than before. Thus the chemical war is
never won, and all life is caught in its violent crossfire.
Id.
85. Id. at 80.
Ragweed, the bane of hay fever sufferers, offers an interesting exam-
ple of the way efforts to control nature sometimes boomerang. Many
thousands of gallons of chemicals have been discharged along roadsides
in the name of ragweed control. But the unfortunate truth is that blan-
ket spraying is resulting in more ragweed, not less. Ragweed is an annu-
al; its seedlings require open soil to become established each year. Our
best protection against this plant is therefore the maintenance of dense
shrubs, ferns, and other perennial vegetation. Spraying frequently de-
stroys this protective vegetation and creates open, barren areas which the
ragweed hastens to fill.
Id.; see id. at 112-113.
[S]cientific studies have established the critical role of birds in insect con-
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effects of pesticide spraying, such as the ease with which a pesti-
cide spreads through the food chain and its insolubility in the
human body.8" Finally, Carson provides nontoxic alternatives to
wholesale chemical spraying that meet the goals of spraying, but
visit none of the lethal effects." In short, Carson proves to her
reader the value of information in decisionmaking and makes us
understand that we cannot assert or even recognize our right to
a cleaner environment without knowledge about toxins.88
4. The Law's Response to Carson's Ideal: The National
Environmental Policy Act
NEPA, discussed above in terms of transforming externalities
into internal costs, 8 9 also serves as a direct translation into law
of Carson's philosophy on the right to, and need for, public infor-
mation. ° NEPA requires that all government agents study the
environmental effects of their activities as part of the process of
trol . . . . But what happens in nature is not allowed to happen in the
modern, chemical-drenched world, where spraying destroys not only the
insects but their principle enemy, the birds. When later there is a resur-
gence of the insect population, as almost always happens, the birds are
not there to keep their numbers in check.
Id. See generally id. at 245-75 (discussing the ability of nature to adapt to chemicals
and resist their effects).
86. Id. at 22-23 ("One of the most sinister features of DDT and related chemicals
is the way they are passed on from one organism to another through all the links of
the food chains .... The poison may also be passed on from mother to offspring.").
See generally id. at 187-243 (discussing the specific health risks associated with
chemical pollution).
87. The irony of [the] all-out chemical assault on roadsides and utility rights-
of-way is twofold. It is perpetuating the problem it seeks to correct, for
as experience has clearly shown, the blanket application of herbicides
does not permanently control roadside "brush" and the spraying has to be
repeated year after year. And as a fiurther irony, we persist in doing this
despite the fact that a perfectly sound method of selective spraying is
known, which can achieve long-term vegetational control and eliminate
repeated spraying in most types of vegetation.
Id. at 74.
88. Id. at 13 ("It is the public that is being asked to assume the risks that the
insect controllers calculate. The public must decide whether it wishes to continue on
the present road, and it can do so only when in full possession of the facts.").
89. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
90. For another example of a disclosure statute, see the EPCRKA, 42 U.S.C. §§
11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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deciding whether and how to engage in those activities.91 In
addition to forcing informed decisionmaking on the part of gov-
ernment actors, NEPA also informs the public. NEPA requires
government actors to record their studies of the environmental
impacts of planned actions in reports that are available to the
public.2 Thus, NEPA's statutory language serves readily as
evidence of Carson's philosophy translated into law.
Over the quarter century of its existence, NEPA has suffered
severely from political and judicial backlash against environ-
mentalism. The Supreme Court has firmly relegated NEPA's
role to that of requiring agencies to consider environmental
impacts and project alternatives, rejecting arguments that
NEPA requires agencies to take the most environmentally be-
nign course of action identified through the NEPA analysis pro-
cess.93 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,94 the Supreme
Court rejected the argument that a citizen-plaintiff may suffer
a "procedural injury" when government actors violate a re-
quired procedure.95 Although these trends do not combine to
91. The key provision of NEPA requires federal agencies to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official
on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
92. Id. ("Copies of [the environmental impact report prepared by a federal agency
pertaining to a planned action] and the comments and views of the appropriate
Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce envi-
ronmental standards, shall be made available to . . . the public . . . ").
93. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989)
("NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather than unwise-agency action.");
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980)
(holding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development adequately consid-
ered the environmental consequences of its decision); see also Carolina Envtl. Study
Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (approving an Environmental
Impact Statement that did not give weighty consideration to a potential environmen-
tal impact determined to be remote but devastating).
94. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
95. Id. at 571-78. The Court argued that the citizen suit provision of the ESA, 16
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negate a citizen's right to sue to enforce NEPA," they demon-
strate that a citizen's right to environmental impact informa-
tion is shrinking.
At the present time, however, NEPA does serve environmen-
talists well in its function of informing. Moreover, by providing a
legal basis for questioning federal agencies' adherence to the
statute, NEPA allows environmentalists to negotiate with and
influence federal agencies. Indeed, Rachel Carson might have
favored the use of NEPA in a 1987 Oregon case that was strong-
ly reminiscent of Murphy v. Butler.97 In the case, challengers to
a state program for the eradication of gypsy moths by aerial pes-
ticide spraying utilized NEPA to force a five-year environmental
impact study prior to the program's commencement." One can
only guess whether Carson would have been heartened by the
legal leverage provided by NEPA, which was unavailable in
Murphy, or disappointed at the government's persistence in
attempting to eradicate insects.9
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988), does not create a procedural right for any person to sue a
federal agency and, more generally, that "an individual (can enforce procedural
rights] so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threat-
ened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing." Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572, 573 n.8.
96. See Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1354 (9th
Cir. 1994) (explaining that Defenders of Wildlife does not preclude a plaintiff from
alleging a procedural injury when the agency procedure would protect a direct and
personal interest of that plaintiff).
97. 362 U.S. 929 (1960).
98. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. In Kunzman, the plaintiffs challenged an EIS discussing Oregon's plan to
undertake aerial spraying of chemical insecticides to eradicate gypsy moths. Id. at
489. Litigation commenced in 1982 and proceeded through four phases, each inspir-
ing additions and alterations to the EIS. Id. at 489-90. The court first discussed the
requirement set forth in the NEPA regulations that an EIS be written in plain lan-
guage so that the public may readily understand it, id. at 492-94, then discussed
the requirement that an EIS contain a "worst case" analysis in its discussion of
potential environmental impacts of the planned action, id. at 494-95, and finally
briefly reviewed the potential cumulative effect the planned action would have on
the environment, id. at 496.
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B. The Responsibility To Maintain Multiple and Well-Dispersed
Species
[I]n nature nothing exists alone."
[Elach living thing is bound to its world by many threads,
weaving the intricate design of the fabric of life."'
1. Carson's Ideal: The Web of Life
Silent Spring does not paint human technological advance-
ment as patently evil." 2 Indeed, nowhere in Carson's writing
does she advocate the eradication of human comforts as an ad-
versarial response to the chemical industry's program to eradi-
cate pests.' 3 Instead, Carson promotes self-control in human
behavior and respect for the environment in the form of atten-
tion to maintaining a variety of widely dispersed species as the
core of ecologically safe behavior.'0 4 In Carson's view, the more
100. CARSON, supra note 22, at 51.
101. RACHEL CARSON, THE EDGE OF THE SEA 14 (1955).
102. Carson uses some uncompromising terms when discussing certain human en-
deavors. She states that "radiation is now the unnatural creation of man's tampering
with the atom. [In addition, tihe chemicals to which life is asked to make its adjust-
ment . . .are the synthetic creations of man's inventive mind, brewed in his labora-
tories, and having no counterparts in nature." CARSON, supra note 22, at 7. Carson
paid painstaking attention to her word choice, and there is little doubt that the
negative imagery was intentional.
103. Id. at 9 ("All this is not to say there is no insect problem and no need of
control. I am saying, rather, that control must be geared to realities, not to mythical
situations, and that the methods employed must be such that they do not destroy us
along with the insects").
104. Id. at 10.
Nature has introduced great variety into the landscape, but man has
displayed a passion for simplifying it. Thus he undoes the built-in checks
and balances by which nature holds the species within bounds . . . . A
generation or more ago, the towns of large areas of the United States
lined their streets with the noble elm tree. Now the beauty they hope-
fully created is threatened with complete destruction as disease sweeps
through the elms, carried by a beetle that would have only limited
chance to build up large populations and to spread from tree to tree if
the elms were only occasional trees in a richly diversified planting.
Id.; see also id. at 117 ("The key to a healthy plant or animal community lies in
what the British ecologist Charles Elton calls 'the conservation of variety.'").
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we address the goal of ecological diversity in our decisionmaking,
the more responsibly we live.'
Indeed, ecological diversity may serve as the cornerstone of
Carson's scientific solution to the inevitable environmental deg-
radation that humans cause."0 Carson's call for humans to fo-
cus on the importance of species diversity offers an ultimate goal
and benchmark for self-control against alarming increases in the
level and toxicity of pollution resulting from technological devel-
opment and population growth.0 7
2. The Law's Response to Carson's Ideal: Species and Habitat
Protection
Carson's philosophic ideal of focusing on ecological diversity as
the crucial benchmark in determining how and when to control
human activities has been reflected in environmental law in the
decades since her death in 1964, in both obvious and subtle
ways. For example, NEPA's requirement that an environmental
impact statement (EIS) address the cumulative impact on the
environment of a proposed agency action is a clear example of
the law reflecting Carson's emphasis on the importance of main-
taining a balance in nature.' The cumulative impact analysis
105. The view that humans must work to maintain species diversity contrasts di-
rectly with the view that humans may conquer or control nature or eradicate even
an inconvenient element of nature.
We need a more high-minded orientation and a deeper insight ....
Life is a miracle beyond our comprehension .... The resort to weapons
such as insecticides to control it is a proof of insufficient knowledge and
of an incapacity so to guide the processes of nature that brute force be-
comes unnecessary. Humbleness is in order; there is no excuse for sci-
entific conceit here.
Id. at 275 (quoting C.J. Briejer, The Growing Resistance of Insects to Insecticides, 13
ATL. NATURALIST 149-55 (1958)).
106. CARSON, supra note 22, at 64 ("The earth's vegetation is part of a web of life
in which there are intimate and essential relations between plants and the earth,
between plants and other plants, between plants and animals.").
107. Id. at 7.
The rapidity of change and the speed with which new situations are
created follow the impetuous and heedless pace of man rather than the
deliberate pace of nature . . . . To adjust to [man's chemical creations]
would require time on the scale that is nature's; it would require not
merely the years of a man's life but the life of generations.
Id.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (1994) (requiring agencies to consider "[c]umulative
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requires the preparer of an EIS to address the environmental
impact of a proposed action in the context of existing and other
proposed activities already impacting the environment in the
vicinity of the proposed action."9
Wetland protection is another example of the law's attempt to
espouse the Carson ideal of maintaining a diverse and balanced
ecosystem. Wetlands are ecologically valuable as wildlife habi-
tats, flood control areas, and natural filters of polluted rain and
groundwaters." ° Addressed (although not by name) in the
Clean Water Act (CWA), wetlands are protected by a permit
system designed to minimize their destruction while allowing
some development in and around wetland areas."'
In spite of continued, if not increasing, appreciation of the
ecological importance of wetlands, as well as a growing body of
experience documenting a discouraging failure rate in attempts
to replicate wetlands,"2 the present administration's policy is
to follow the conservatives' concept of "no net loss," which is a
program designed to ease the general statutory prohibition
against wetland destruction with promises to create wetlands
where they will visit less inconvenience on development
plans."3 In addition, because wetland protection regulations
often exact the cost of a broadly enjoyed public benefit from
relatively few development-hungry landowners, flat development
prohibitions invite takings challenges, thus further encouraging
exploration of compromisory options."' Legal protection of
actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively signif-
icant impacts").
109. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 106-07 (1983).
110. Virginia C. Veltman, Comment, Banking on the Future of Wetlands Using
Federal Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 654, 654-55 (1995).
111. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 33 C.F.R. pt. 320 (1994);
40 C.F.R. pts. 230, 231 (1994).
112. Veltman, supra note 110, at 665-70 (citing WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORA-
TION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE (John A. Kisler & Mary E. Kentula eds., 1990)).
113. See David Johnston, White House Asks Revision of Rules to Save Wetlands,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al; Linda Kanamine, Wetlands Policy Appeases, Does-
n't Please, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1993, at 6A, see also Veltman, supra note 110, at
657 (describing the "no net loss" policy).
114. Compare United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)
(upholding an Army Corps of Engineers definition of wetlands challenged as
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wetlands, like species protection, thus suffers from the usual
arsenal of political and legal challenges, evidencing a backlash
at times when economic or other considerations spark a resur-
gence of the view of humans as the great global eradicators.
The ESA,"5 as originally promulgated, also elevates the
philosophical teaching of Carson over more traditional legal
goals. An early version of the Act contained an absolute ban on
federal government actions that detrimentally impacted endan-
gered species or their habitats.11 In a judicial opinion that
Carson might have penned, the Supreme Court upheld the stat-
utory requirement that federal agencies must '"insure that
[their] actions... do not jeopardize the continued existence' of
an endangered species or 'result in the destruction or modifica-
tion of habitat of such species.""' 7 The Court read the statute
to reveal "[the plain intent of Congress... to halt and reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.""
8
The ESA is, unfortunately, as fine an example of environmen-
tal backlash as it is an example of the law embracing Carson's
view of the importance of maintaining a biodiverse environment.
The ESA reputation for prioritizing wildlife over human econom-
ic costs has resulted in widespread public animosity toward
it." '9 Due to the backlash following the decision in Tennessee
overbroad and limiting the takings question to a review of the propriety of agency
action denying a permit to develop in a wetland) with Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that lower court must consider
whether government's prohibition on mining diminished market value of land to
determine whether government regulation constituted a taking), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1053 (1987).
115. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 160 (1978) ("All .. . Federal
departments and agencies shall . .. [take] such action necessary to insure that ac-
tions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the destruc-
tion or modification of habitat of such species.") (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
117. Id. at 173 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
118. Id. at 184.
119. See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by
the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 278
(1993) (quoting Michael Wines, Bush, in Far West, Sides with Loggers, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 1992, at A25 (quoting President Bush as saying: "The Endangered Species
Act was intended as a shield for species against the effects of major construction
projects like highways and dams, not a sword aimed at the jobs, families and com-
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Valley Authority v. Hill,2 ' Congress and the implementing
agencies have whittled the ESA down to far less than an invinci-
ble monument to human dedication to bio- and habitat-
diversity. 2'
Possibly the clearest symbolic statement of the backlash
against legal respect for the web of life brings us once again to
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." In a case questioning whether
the ESA applies to American actions overseas, the Supreme
Court dismissed several closely related theories of standing
premised on the view that all persons live in a "contiguous eco-
system" in which injury to a species overseas harms persons in
the United States having an interest in those species.'" The
Court agreed that a person who worked with a particular animal
threatened by a federal decision faced perceptible harm, but
discarded the idea that a person is harmed by a threat to a
species in another part of the world as "pure speculation and
fantasy." 24 "[Plure speculation and fantasy" is thus the Court's
frank view of Carson's web of life.
C. The Moral Instinct To Preserve
Incidents [of painful deaths among birds and animals due to
munities of entire regions like the Northwest .... It's time to put people ahead of
owls.")).
120. 437 U.S. 153 (1960).
121. Compare the excerpt from an earlier version of the ESA, supra note 116, with
the following version of the Act:
Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded,
or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species ...
unless such agency has been granted an exemption for such action by the
[Endangered Species] Committee.
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); see also Portland Audubon
Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering a hear-
ing to determine whether the Bush Administration illegally lobbied the Endangered
Species Committee to allow logging on federal land in Oregon); Houck, supra not6
119, at 282-85 (noting the relatively small number of animals added to the list each
year).
122. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
123. Id. at 565.
124. Id. at 566.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:381
pesticides] raise a question that is not only scientific but mor-
al. The question is whether any civilization can wage relent-
less war on life... without losing the right to be called civi-
lized .... By acquiescing in [acts] that can cause such suf-
fering to a living creature, who among us is not diminished as
a human being?'25
Perhaps the most abstract aspect of Carson's philosophy, and
also the message of her writing that renders her works inspira-
tional as well as accessible to several generations of readers,'26
is her faith that humans possess a deep-seated instinct to pro-
tect and preserve nature and the earth, both for nature's sake
and for future generations of humans, in spite of our simplistic
infatuation with dominating and destroying nature.'27 Carson
expresses this fundamental aspect of her philosophy in terms
that readers may conclude -have a moral, religious, 2 ' or
anthropological tone. 2 ' Whatever one's view, Carson's endur-
125. CARSON, supra note 22, at 99-100.
126. See Ann H. Zwinger, Introduction to RACHEL CARSON, THE SEA AROUND US
xxvi (1989) ("[S]o skillful a writer was Carson that, despite the book's loaded mes-
sage, it became an immediate best-seller, urging a huge public to wake up to its
responsibilities toward the natural world.").
[Rachel Carson] is the pure nature writer, the clear-eyed describer who
leads us not only to new perceptions of the sea itself, but to the deeper
understandings of how it all fits together ....
Sitting there alone on the beach reading I was moved to joy and
despair. I stopped reading with a sense of sadness for the dramatic tran-
sition that came in her lifetime, which she helped bring about, from the
Age of Innocence to the Age of Awareness .... Through sharing Carson's
research, we become acutely sensitive to the interdependence of life.
Id. at xx-xxi.
127. CARSON, supra note 22, at 297 ("The 'control of nature' is a phrase conceived
in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was
supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man.").
128. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 9 ("[I]er attitude toward the natural world was that
of a deeply religious person.").
129. For a modern discussion of morality and the environment, see Theodore
Roszak, The Greening of Psychology, 67 UTNE READER 51 (1995):
We see ecopsychology as an effort to strengthen our sympathetic bond
with the natural world. One name for that bond-a new one-is "the
ecological unconscious." But there are other, older names. In ancient
days, it was called the anima mundi; many tribal people speak of it as
their connection with Mother Earth and Father Sun and all our winged,
finned, and four-legged relatives. Ecopsychology, far from being something
412
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ing faith in a basic human instinct to coexist, hampered primari-
ly by human ignorance,3 ' is peculiarly nonlegal in nature.
1. Carson's Ideal: Humans Must Accept and Defer to the
Ecological Law of Interrelatedness
Readers of any of Carson's works find examples of a primary
tenet of ecology underlying the need to maintain ecological di-
versity--environmental interrelatedness. From her almost mys-
tical observations of the "interchangeability of land and sea in
this marginal world of the shore"'3' to her scientific explana-
tion of the subterranean migration of toxins emanating from the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal,' 2 Carson makes us acutely aware of
the "delicately adjusted, interlocking relationships" that link all
forms of life. 1" From Carson's perspective, responding to envi-
ronmental degradation is a positive duty more akin to a fiducia-
ry stewardship than a punishment.'
Carson is willing to cast blame, however, and does not elevate
herself above such plebeian concepts as fault.33 In The Sea
new under the sun, belongs to the original form of environmentalism and
the oldest tradition of psychological healing we know.
Id.
130. CARSON, supra note 126, at 95 ("Most of man's habitual tampering with
nature's balance . . . has been done in ignorance of the fatal chain of events that
would follow.").
131. CARSON, supra note 101, at 6. Later in the same chapter, Carson observes
that "[n]owhere on the shore is the relation of a creature to its surroundings a mat-
ter of a single cause and effect; each living thing is bound to its world by many
threads, weaving the intricate design of the fabric of life." Id. at 14.
132. CARSON, supra note 22, at 43.
133. CARSON, supra note 126, at 33. Carson focuses on the interrelationships that
exist among the lives in the sea:
[T]hrough a series of delicately adjusted, interlocking relationships, the
life of all parts of the sea is linked. What happens to a diatom in the
upper, sunlit strata of the sea may well determine what happens to a
cod lying on a ledge of some rocky canyon a hundred fathoms below, or
to a bed of multicolored, gorgeously plumed seaworms carpeting an un-
derlying shoal, or to a prawn creeping over the soft oozes of the sea floor
in the blackness of mile-deep water.
Id.
134. See Rachel Carson, Preface to the 1961 Edition of CARSON, supra note 126, at
xi ("[Mian's record as a steward of the natural resources of the earth has been a
discouraging one.").
135. BROOKS, supra note 1, at 9 ("[Slhe would probably have recoiled at the term
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Around Us, she portrays human tampering with nature in
sharp, sometimes unforgiving terms.3 ' In Silent Spring, she
identifies the chemical industry as instrumental in developing
chemical solutions to environmental problems, in obscuring
potential long-term and external harms, and in denying causal
connections between chemical products and tragic environmental
conditions.'37 In addition, Carson identifies as guilty the con-
sumer, whether farmer or urban homeowner, who is eager for
the quick cure for labor or nuisances and unconcerned about the
scientific realities associated with chemicals.'
i
Ultimately, the reader of Silent Spring understands that all
persons share responsibility for the human, biological, and eco-
logical suffering allowed in a culture that overvalues comfort
and readily, if not proudly, accepts the fact that humans may
cause a long-term imbalance in nature.'39 Carson asks whether
'nun of nature' that has sometimes been applied to her.").
136. CARSON, supra note 126, at 93-95.
[Mian, unhappily, has written one of his blackest records as a destroyer
on the oceanic islands. He has seldom set foot on an island that he has
not brought about disastrous changes .... Upon species after species of
island life, the black night of extinction has fallen....
When man came in and rudely disturbed this balance, he set off a whole
series of chain reactions....
Id.
137. CARSON, supra note 22, at 64.
Sometimes we have no choice but to disturb these relationships [between
living things and the earth], but we should do so thoughtfully, with full
awareness that what we do may have consequences remote in time and
place. But no such humility marks the booming "weed killer" business of
the present day, in wlich soaring sales and expanding uses mark the
production of plant-killing chemicals.
Id.
138. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
139. CARSON, supra note 22, at 246.
In some quarters nowadays it is fashionable to dismiss the balance
of nature as a state of affairs that prevailed in an earlier, simpler
world-a state that has now been so thoroughly upset that we might as
well forget it .... The balance of nature is not the same today as in
Pleistocene times, but it is still there: a complex, precise, and highly
integrated system of relationships between living things which cannot
safely be ignored any more than the law of gravity can be defied with
impunity by a man perched on the edge of a cliff. The balance of na-
ture is not a status quo; it is fluid, ever shifting, in a constant state
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any of us is untainted by the suffering of dying birds and squir-
rels exposed to DDT.4 ' She convinces us that the blame for
such widespread slaughter lies somewhere deeper than with a
chemical industry that simply utilized a laissez-faire economic
and political system in which the balance of nature plays no
part.
As a scientist and nature lover, Carson laments all narrowly
focused actions that ignore their environmentally destructive
fallout, whether the decisionmakers acted out of greed, a
prioritizing of values that undervalued the environment, or
ignorance. As a scientist, she does not focus her primary atten-
tion on differentiating between degrees of intent, but chastises
chemical companies for sacrificing life for dollars and customers
for their ignorance about the effects of pesticides they apply to
their crops in eager anticipation of the quick fix that such pesti-
cides supply. In short, Rachel Carson's model for considering
actions that visit destruction on the environment is that actors
should be responsible for the harmful effects of their actions
regardless of knowledge or intent. As is suitable for a scientist,
she does not excuse actors for acting in ignorance.
of adjustment.
Id.
140. Id. at 99-100.
These creatures are innocent of any harm to man. Indeed, by their very
existence they and their fellows make his life more pleasant. Yet lie
rewards them with a death that is not only sudden but horrible. Scien-
tific observers at Sheldon described the symptoms of a meadowlark found
near death: "Although it lacked muscular coordination and could not fly
or stand, it continued to beat its wings and clutch with its toes while
lying on its side. Its beak was held open and breathing was labored."
Even more pitiful was the mute testimony of the dead ground squirrels,
which "exhibited a characteristic attitude in death. The back was bowed,
and the forelegs with the toes of the feet tightly clenched were drawn
close to the thorax . . . . The head and neck were outstretched and the
mouth often contained dirt, suggesting that the dying animal had been
biting at the ground.
Id. (quoting Thomas A. Scott et al., Some Effects of a Field Application of Dieldrin
on Wildlife, 23 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 409-27 (1959)).
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2. The Law's Response to Carson's Ideal: Superfund Liability
Harnessing Carson's philosophy of human responsibility for
maintaining ecological diversity into a statutory yoke was a task
legislators could accomplish only by transcending a number of
customary features of law.' In a world where human techno-
logical genius coupled with human ecological ignorance constant-
ly threatens to extinguish whole species and habitats despite our
alleged instinct to preserve, the primacy in law of mental state
as the major determinant of degrees of liability must logically
defer to the ability to control as the primary determinant of
legal responsibility for an imbalance in nature.142
Likewise, Carson's goal of species and habitat diversity urges
forfeiture of the traditional legal attention to causation in the
environmental arena. The image of the seamless ecological web
does not juxtapose neatly with that of the legal causation chain,
its links representing well-defined degrees of proximity and its
length directly proportionate to its vulnerability to defenses cast
in terms of superceding and intervening events.' Legal causa-
141. A number of CERCLA sections indicate a congressional intent to avoid adver-
sity wherever possible in order to effect prompt cleanups. See, e.g., CERCIA, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (1988) (postponing judicial review of challenges to cleanup orders
until after the cleanup in most cases).
142. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1418 (6th Cir.
1991).
"First, Congress intended that the federal government be immediately
given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to problems
of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second,
Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the
disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedy-
ing the harmful conditions they created."
Id. (quoting United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1122 (D.
Minn. 1982)) (emphasis added).
143. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984).
"Proximate cause" is merely the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of [iis]
conduct . . . . As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited
to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of
such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon
the basis of some social idea of justice or policy.
Id.; see also id. § 44 (discussing intervening causes).
416
ENVIRONMENTALISM'S RITE OF SPRING
tion is premised on a sterile environment where the effects of
actions are not tainted by distracting principles like the inter-
connectedness of all earthly things. Carson's perspective is far
better reflected by a legal construct that forfeits causation in
favor of meeting the obligation of maintaining a balanced na-
ture.' Possibly the clearest example of an environmental stat-
ute that captures Carson's perspective on mental culpability and
causation is CERCLA.
CERCLA bases liability on a party's relationship with a
Superfund site, and only secondarily addresses the mental state
of liable parties. 45 The statute incorporates a liability scheme
that requires no specified proof that a defendant's acts or prac-
tices were responsible for the incurrence of cleanup costs.
46
Liability is status-based, imposed upon persons and entities that
fall within one or more of four definitions of liable parties."'
Certainly, in many cases, persons and entities that fit the re-
sponsible party definition in CERCLA also bear a direct causal
relationship to cleanup costs, thereby conforming to traditional
notions of legal causality.'48 CERCLA's language, however, al-
144. Indeed, Carson teaches that humankind's genetic heritage is more valuable
than the individual. CARSON, supra note 22, at 208.
145. Under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988), civil liability is status-based. Howev-
er, liability limits do not apply when events of pollution were the result of willful
misconduct or willful negligence or where the primary cause of an event of pollution
was a knowing violation of a standard or regulation. Id. § 9607(c). In addition, puni-
tive damages may be imposed for noncooperation in a cleanup plan. Id.
146. Id. § 9607(a) (designating as liable parties who are associated with a site
"from which there is a release [of a hazardous substance], or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of respofise costs"). Thus, the causation exists between
the contamination and the cleanup costs, and not between the defendants' actions
and the harm to the environment. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a site owner, liable under the statutory defi-
nition of liable party at § 107(a), could not avoid liability by showing that it neither
owned the site at the time of disposal nor caused the contamination at the site).
147. Those liable include: (1) owners and operators of the contaminated site; (2)
past owners and operators who owned or operated the contaminated site at the time
hazardous substances were disposed of at the site; (3) persons who arranged for the
disposal of hazardous substances at the contaminated site; and (4) persons who ac-
cepted hazardous substances for transportation to the contaminated site. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a).
148. For example, a party that disposed of a particularly high volume of hazardous
substances at a contaminated site, or one that disposed of particularly toxic waste,
such that that party's individual contribution to the site necessitates government
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lows interpretations of its causation element that stretch liabili-
ty even beyond what strict liability generally allows.' The
fact that state of mind is secondary in CERCLA may be its
strongest and most intimidating feature because it subordinates
the basic legal tenet of culpability to CERCLA's primary pur-
pose-environmental cleanup.
50
Few examples are necessary to establish how courts have
prioritized the government's need to detoxify over the usual
checks and balances of the legal system. In the landmark case of
United States v. Wade, 5' for example, the court adhered stern-
ly to the language of CERCLA, finding that a particular party's
waste need not be at a site for the party to be held liable, as
long as some amount of waste of the type sent by the defendant
is present at the site.'52 In Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
action against the spread of contamination, might be deemed to have actually caused
the incurrence of cleanup costs in the traditional sense. A party that contributed a
minimal amount of hazardous waste to a site that by itself would necessitate no
cleanup has caused the incurrence of cleanup costs only in the attenuated sense that
"[tihe fatal trespass done by Eve was cause of all our woe." W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(observing that it would be "absurd" to treat the disposal of a single copper penny
as a disposal of hazardous substance, but admitting that the structure of CERCLA
allows for it). A particularly interesting feature of CERCLA's strict liability scheme
is that the statute does not expressly define the standard of liability as strict.
150. See THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 14.01[1], at 14-15 (Susan M. Cooke ed., 1993) ("Fairness to [defendants]
was not a major priority of Congress in enacting CERCLA ...nor of the courts in
construing the statute.") (citing O'Neill v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990)) [hereinafter HAZARDOUS WASTE].
151. 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-32 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Wade was the first opinion to
discuss the question of CERCLA causation in detail. See HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra
note 150, § 14.01[4][d], at 14-133.
152. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333; see also Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co.,
866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989) (indicating that the simple fact of a release
invokes liability against all persons falling within the listed parties under CERCIA);
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988) (indicating that the
elimination of the need for CERCLA plaintiffs to bear a heavy causation burden was
due to congressional awareness of the "synergistic and migratory capacities" of toxins
and the "technological infeasibility" of tracing the source of released toxins), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 F. Supp. 177,
195-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that contribution of below-ambient concentrations of
a hazardous substance to a hazardous waste site may still trigger liability).
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Farms Dairy, Inc.," the First Circuit may have extended
CERCLA liability further than any other court to date. The
court indicated that a "threatened release[" that a plaintiff
might reasonably think could contaminate public wells may
cause the incurrence of response costs for which the defendant
may be held liable, even without any contamination migrating
from the defendant's plant to the plaintiffs wells.'
The lack of any need to establish that a CERCLA defendant
has committed a "bad act" may be best exemplified by
CERCLA's imposition of retroactive liability. In Arizona v.
Motorola, Inc.,55 a district court held that the defendant had
transported a hazardous substance, as defined under CERCLA,
and incurred liability, even though the waste materials were
deposited in a landfill in accordance with all applicable laws and
regulations in existence at the time of the deposit.'56 The case
is not unique in its analysis of CERCLA's infamous retroactive
applicability.157
Congress and the courts have scrutinized CERCLA's liability
scheme, particularly in connection with charges against its fair-
ness. 5 ' One proposal-the elimination of joint and several lia-
bility in favor of liability apportioned among defendants in pro-
portion to cleanup costs caused by their contributions-would se-
153. 889 F.2d 1146 (lst Cir. 1989).
154. Id. at 1154. On remand, however, the district court held that Dedham Water
could not recover cleanup costs from Cumberland Farms, finding that causation proof
is required in a two-site private party CERCLA action. See Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D. Mass. 1991), affd 972 F.2d
453 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp.
1269, 1287 (D. Del. 1987) (holding that proof of migration of defendant's waste to
plaintiffs site is required in a two-site private CERCLA action), affd, 851 F.2d 643
(3d Cir. 1988).
155. 774 F. Supp. 566 (D. Ariz. 1991).
156. Id. at 573-75.
157. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co. (NEPACCO),
810 F.2d 726, 737 (8th Cir. 1986) (reversing the lower court holding that CERCLA
contains no liability limitation for cleanup costs incurred due to pre-enactment ac-
tions of the defendant), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also United States v.
Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 429-32 (D.N.J. 1991) (upholding retroactive liability);
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985) (supporting the
Eighth Circuit's decision in NEPACCO).
158. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also United States v. DiBiase,
45 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding the government's consent decree fair).
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verely alter the plaintiffs burden under CERCLA.'59 In short,
including a heightened causation element in CERCLA would
replace the potentially overwhelming unfairness of joint and
several liability with a potentially impossible task of establish-
ing causation among countless contributors to a complex envi-
ronmental condition.
160
In addition to these political rumblings, recent cases indicate
a judicial backlash against CERCLA's causation element as
well. 6 ' In a recent case, Dana Corp. v. American Standard,
Inc.,"'62 Judge Robert L. Miller articulated a new evidentiary
standard to support an inference that a particular defendant
disposed of a hazardous substance at a site. According to Judge
Miller, if the plaintiff in a CERCLA action cannot demonstrate
that a defendant produced "a continuous and predictable waste
stream ... [then] the plaintiff must present some further evi-
dence to justify a reasonable factfinder in inferring that the
defendant contributed to the hazardous waste at the site."'63
159. Presently, defendants who prove that cleanup costs are allocable may limit
their liability to the cleanup costs apportioned to their contribution to the site. See
In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894-902 (5th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 269 (3d Cir. 1992).
160. For general criticism of CERCLA's effectiveness, see Administration of the
Federal Superfund Program: Hearings Before the Subcoumm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 517-71 (1992) (containing a GAO report entitled PROBLEMS WITH THE COM-
PLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF SITE CLEANUP PLANS); see also HAZARDOUS WASTE,
supra note 150, § 14.01[1].
161. Possibly the first case to be cited widely was Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,
889 F.2d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 1989) (requiring the plaintiff to establish a "standard of
justification" for why a release has "caused the incurrence of response costs"); see
also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (noting
that a court may use equitable factors when apportioning damages); United States v.
A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (concluding that the
joint and several liability versus apportionment issue may depend on equitable con-
siderations, particularly in connection with contributors of low quantities of waste to
a site).
162. 866 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
163. Id. at 1489. More completely, the court stated that a CERCLA plaintiff must
establish that the defendant produced "a continuous and predictable waste stream
that included hazardous constituents of the sort eventually found at the site, and
that at least some significant part of that continuous and predictable waste stream
was disposed of at the site." Id. The court did not burden the plaintiff with "finger-
printing" the very toxins located at the hazardous waste site as coming from a par-
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Judge Miller's opinion is not isolated in its interpretation of the
CERCLA plaintiffs burden of proof164 and is consistent with a
recent EPA policy guideline on CERCLA liability.165
From Rachel Carson's moral perspective, eliminating retroac-
tive liability and elevating the intent and causation elements in
establishing CERCLA liability would represent a decided step
away from a view of environmentalism as a moral and instinc-
tive human responsibility. Rachel Carson condemns intentional
pollution and purposeful or negligent ignorance of environmental
consequences as morally irresponsible or worse, but ultimately
focuses on the need to control toxins, recognize the long-term
dangers of leaving toxins in the environment, and restore and
maintain a balance in nature. These goals are difficult, if not
impossible, when our responsibility for the environment is cast
as a legal relationship that parallels our legal relationships with
other persons.
III. THE LAW OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
Perhaps more than any other environmental law concept,
NRD has the potential to represent progress toward a legal
structure that incorporates Carson's philosophy. The NRD con-
cept can be found in statutory language as early as 1973.166
Until recently, however, the cause of action for NRD authorized
under the major federal statutes addressing NRD has lain dor-
mant, hibernating until a time when positive political attention
creates a hospitable environment for NRD survival and the
implementation of new regulations marks the path to legal via-
ticular source. Instead, the court attempted to shield from liability those defendants
whose waste was highly unlikely to have contributed significantly to toxic conditions
at the site requiring response actions. Id. at 1533.
164. See B. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180, 184 (D. Conn. 1993) (re-
fusing to extend CEROLA liability when no direct evidence of disposal at the site
was supplied); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Conn. 1993)
(holding that proof of disposal is necessary to extend liability); Barnes Landfill, Inc.
v. Town of Highland, 802 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (requiring proof that
the defendant actually contributed hazardous waste to the site).
165. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON CERCLA SETTLE-
MENTS WITH DE MICROMIS WASTE CONTRIBUTORS (1993).
166. See Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C §§ 1651-1656 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
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bility.'"' At present, harbingers of the full and active exercise
of NRD claims are discernable. 6 ' Regulations have been for-
mulated, with some finalized and some in draft form.'69 The
final rule issued by the DOI is presently undergoing review in
the District of Columbia Circuit."
This state of budding development, occurring one human
generation after Rachel Carson's death in 1964, presents a spe-
cial opportunity for examining the durability of her philosophy
in environmental law. " 1 As a means of translating environ-
mental losses into financial liabilities, a concept yet to be satis-
factorily addressed in American law and politics, the law of NRD
has spawned debate on its potential for unfairly imposing irre-
sponsibly-derived, nontraditional business costs on members of
commerce and industry.17 The debate over the NRD liability
scheme allows us to observe just how sturdy the Carsonian con-
cepts set forth above have become in the law, or whether old
debates on issues such as environmental law's unfairness and
the threat it presents to the United States economy have some-
167. NRD's dormancy may be in part due to the fact that EPA has historically
focused its energy on cleanup issues rather than on natural resource damages. At
present, EPA is not a NRD trustee and therefore has no statutory duties regarding
NRD. See Kevin A. Gaynor & Carol E. Dinkins, Natural Resource Damages Under
CERCLA and OPA '90, in THE NEW RULES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE AS-
SESSMENTS AND CLAIMS UNDER CERCLA AND OPA 412, 422 (1994) [hereinafter THE
NEW RULES]. In addition, the 1986 amendments to Superfund, the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), cut off the availability of the
Superfund Trust Fund for NRD claims, creating another hurdle for NED restoration.
See SARA, 26 U.S.C. § 9507(c)(1) (1988); see also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611(e)(2),
(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (limiting, but not precluding, use of the Fund).
168. SARA added language to CERCLA, mandating the coordination of NED assess-
ments with cleanup activities. See SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(2).
169. See supra note 28.
170. Chamber of Commerce v. United States Dep't of the Interior, Nos. 94-1462,
94-1467, 94-1468, 94-1470, 94-1472, 94-1474 (D.C. Cir. filed July 21, 1994).
171. This Article is limited to a study of federal NED, although provisions within
CERCLA ensure that it does not preempt states from imposing liabilities addressed
by the Act. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C §§ 9614(a), 9652(d). A number of states have enacted
environmental statutes relating to natural resource injury. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 376.121 (West Supp. 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ch. 324, § 11151 (West Supp.
1995); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.107 (West Supp. 1995).
172. See Rebecca W. Thomson, Expert Testinmny on "New Age" Numbers: The Use
of Contingent Valuation Methodology To Assess Natural Resource Damages, in THE
NEW RULES, supra note 167, at 599, 611-12.
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how regained their fire.
In addition, the present state of NRD development offers more
than just a chance to test the endurance of "traditional" environ-
mental legal battles. Conceptually, NRD surpasses the more
familiar CERCLA scheme, in which those whose profitable activ-
ities produce hazardous waste must bear responsibility for clean-
ing up the environment. Under NRD, those whose profitable
activities defile the environment must nurture the environment
back to health and also pay what might be termed pain and
suffering costs to the public for its loss of enjoyment of the envi-
ronment during the period of environmental convalescence.173
In this way, NRD may represent a significant step forward in
the law's recognition of the earth-human relationship from
Carson's perspective.
This section outlines the present state of NRD, briefly review-
ing one of the major federal statutes and implementing regula-
tions that translate injuries to natural resources into liabilities.
Part IV then applies the principles of Rachel Carson's philoso-
phy, as identified in Part II, to the law of NRD.
A. A Brief Overview of Natural Resource Damages As Addressed
Under Federal Law
I contend.., that we have allowed... chemicals to be used
with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil,
wate, wildlife, and man himself Future generations are
unlikely to condone our lack of prudent concern for the integ-
rity of the natural world that supports all life. 74
Although man's record as a steward of the natural resources
of the earth has been a discouraging one, there has long been
a certain comfort in the belief that the sea, at least, was invio-
late, beyond man's ability to change and despoil. But this
belief, unfortunately, has proved to be naive."'5
173. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(4), (5) (1988); OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2706 (Supp. V
1993); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
174. CARSON, supra note 22, at 13.
175. CARSON, supra note 126, at xi.
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In modern environmental law, the NRD concept was first used
in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973.176 The
Deepwater Port Act of 1974 also addressed NRD. 177 These acts
did not imbue NRD liability with broadly applicable significance
because each act focused on a particular, designated natural re-
source. Congress first addressed NRD as a generalized claim for
oil spills in navigable waters in the Clean Water Act Amend-
ments of 1977, under which the president appoints trustees
representing the United States or a state. 7 ' These trustees are
authorized to sue for "expenses incurred by the Federal Govern-
ment or any State government in the restoration or replacement
of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a dis-
charge of oil or a hazardous substance" that violates the Act.'79
In 1980, Congress marked the amphibious evolution of the
NRD concept by including a claim for NRD to nonaqueous re-
sources in CERCLA.5 ° CERCLA-broadened the NRD claim to
include injury to the environment from hazardous substances in
176. The Act makes the owners of pipeline rights-of-way
strictly liable to all damaged parties, public or private, without regard to
fault for such damages, and without regard to ownership of any affected
lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied
upon by Alaska Natives, Native organizations, or others for subsistence
or economic purposes [for damages resulting from activities along or in
the vicinity of the Trans-Alaskan pipeline right-of-way].
43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (1988).
177. See 33 U.S.C. § 1517(i)(3) (1988).
178. The CWA states that "[t]he costs of removal of oil or a hazardous sub-
stance .. . shall include any costs or expenses incurred by the Federal Government
or any State government in the restoration or replacement of natural resources dam-
aged or destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous substance." CWA,
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1988).
In addition, "[tihe President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall
act on behalf of the public as trustee of the natural resources to recover for the
costs of replacing or restoring such resources. Sums recovered shall be used to re-
store, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources . . . ." Id.
§ 1321(f)(5). Because the CWA NED claim is implemented through the DOI regula-
tions implementing CERCLA, and because it has not spawned the case law or theo-
retical debates that have arisen under the CERCLA NED claim, this Article does
not discuss the CWA NED claim separately from its discussion of the CERCLA
NRD claim.
179. Id. § 1321(f)(4).
180. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1) (1988).
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addition to oil.81 Finally, the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) was pro-
mulgated in major part to address natural resource damages
that resulted from a spill of oil into the Prince William Sound
from the oil tanker Exxon Valdez." 2 In a number of ways, the
OPA expands upon and strengthens the claim authorized under
the CWA.'"
B. Natural Resource Damages Under Superfund
CERCLA was promulgated in 1980, in part to address the
cleanup, or "corrective action," provisions of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on a broader scale.'84 Due
to the breadth of its authority and the singularity of its focus,
CERCLA stands as "the centerpiece of the federal hazardous
substance cleanup and liability program. It provides broad au-
thority for the federal government.., to identify, investigate,
and clean up sites where hazardous substances have been or
181. Id.
182. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. V 1993). OPA liability is established when a
discharge of oil from a vessel or facility results in injury to natural resources or
services in navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone.
See id. §§ 2702(a), (b)(2). Although differences exist between a NRD claim brought
under the OPA and one brought under CERCLA, the two acts structure the liability
action in similar terms. Likewise, the OPA draft rule sets forth procedural and tech-
nical models for trustees to follow in assessing NRD that are similar to those set
forth in the DOI rule implementing the NED claim under CERCLA and the CWA.
The NOAA draft rule is distinguishable from the DOI final rule in a number of
ways, but, because the distinctions for the most part do not impact the evaluation of
those rules for their adherence to Rachel Carson's philosophy, this Article limits its
statutory and regulatory examination primarily to CERCLA and the DOI rule. For a
comparative analysis of the DOI rule and the NOAA draft rule, see Linda
Burlington, Relationship of OPA Rule to CERCLA Rule Found at 43 CFR Part 11, in
THE NEW RULES, supra note 167, at 459; Kevin M. Ward, Natural Resource Damage
Provisions Under CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act, in THE NEW RULES, supra
note 167, at 432.
183. For a thorough discussion of the relationship between the OPA and the CWA,
see Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Corewago Contractors, Inc., 39 Env't Rep. Cas. 1710 (BNA)
(M.D. Pa. 1994).
Other statutes addressing NR] include the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments, 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(C) (1988), and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1443(a)(1), (2)
(1988).
184. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1988) (authorizing government suits and administra-
tive orders to respond to imminent hazards involving hazardous wastes).
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may be released into the environment."'1
Environmental lawyers are familiar with CERCLA liability for
the cleanup of hazardous waste, a collection of activities admin-
istered by EPA and identified in CERCLA as "response" ac-
tions. 8' In addition to its widely recognized cleanup function,
CERCLA includes authority for specified parties to bring claims
for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from... a release [of hazardous
substances to the environment]."87 The assessment of NRD is
meant to function in conjunction with the more widely experi-
enced CERCLA response action, with NRD liability determined
and recovered for those natural resource injuries and losses
that are not fully remedied by the response action. NRD liabili-
ty is therefore premised on response action liability, and an
incident resulting in a natural resource injury for which liabili-
ty can be found under CERCLA must be premised on a threat-
ened or actual release of a hazardous substance as defined in
that statute. 88 Conceivably, where a response action fully re-
stores, rehabilitates, replaces, or acquires the equivalent of an
injured natural resource, NRD would be limited to the value of
lost use of the resource during the time response actions were
conducted.189
185. HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 150, § 12.01[2].
186. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988).
187. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
188. CERCLA defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contami-
nant)." Id. § 9601(22).
Removal actions and remedial actions, which, together with enforcement activi-
ties, make up response actions, are described in detail in CERCLA. Id. §§ 9601(23)-
(24). Together, removal and remedial actions encompass a broad spectrum of activi-
ties, from initially evaluating a release through neutralizing its toxicity, and include
health-related precautions, such as providing security fencing and alternative water
supplies and even permanently relocating persons from the vicinity of a hazardous
substance site. Id.
189. Losses of natural resources appropriate for NRD, however, are not limited to
post-response action losses. See Alaska Sport Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d
769, 772 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "the government trustees are entitled to recov-
er for all lost use damages on behalf of the public, from the time of any release
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CERCLA defines "natural resources" to include "land, fish,
wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies,
and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust
by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United
States,... any State or local government, any foreign govern-
ment, [or] any Indian tribe."90 CERCLA defines "damages" in
its legal sense, as "damages for injury or loss of natural resourc-
es as set forth in section 9607(a) or 9611(b) of this title."'91 In
essence, CERCLA provides statutory authority for government
trustees to translate injuries, destruction, and other losses suf-
fered by nature into monetary values, and to collect those
monetary values, from responsible parties in the form of legal
damages.9 '
A key phrase in this alchemic formula left undefined by
CERCLA is "injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources."'93 Furthermore, CERCLA does not specify the stan-
dard of proof necessary for showing that a particular discharge
or release caused a particular injury to a natural resource.
until restoration"); see also 43 CF.R. § ll.15(a)(1)(ii) (1994) (stating that damages
are to be calculated from- the "onset of the discharge"); Ohio v. United States Dep't
of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 454 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that "Congress
intended damages to at least cover restoration costs").
190. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16).
191. Id. § 9601(6). CERCLA makes defendants liable for, among other ills,
"damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss." Id. § 9607(a)(4)(c).
The Act addresses limitations to the use of the Hazardous Substance Superfund, 26
U.S.C. § 9507(A) (1988), to cover costs associated with NRD claims. CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9611(b)(2)(B). CERCIA also exempts NED assessment costs from constraints
imposed on Fund use for 'claims" associated with injury to natural resources. Id.
§ 9611(c)(1). Although in certain provisions the statute may appear to use the term
"damages" in its nonlegal sense, see id. § 9607(f)(1) (appearing to use the term
"damages" as both a synonym for "injury" and as a legal term), at least one court
has addressed the issue and concluded that natural resource "damages" refers to a
"monetary quantification stemming from an injury" to a natural resource, In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 716 F.
Supp. 676, 681 (D. Mass. 1989).
192. Under CERCLA, the trustees may be federal, state, or local government offi-
cials or Indian tribal officials. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Federal trustees
include divisions within the DOI, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land
Management, the Fish and Vildlife Agency, and the NOAA, which oversees fisheries
and marine mammals.
193. Id.
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CERCLA does, however, assign to the President or his delegee,
in this case, the DOI, the responsibility to develop regulations
implementing NRD assessment "for injury to, destruction of, or
loss of natural resources resulting from a release of oil or a haz-
ardous substance" as addressed under CERCLA and the
CWA.'94 Furthermore, CERCLA designates that the NRD regu-
lations set forth both "standard procedures for simplified assess-
ments" and "alternative protocols" for situations not adaptable to
the standardized procedures.
195
The first DOI regulations promulgated under this directive
addressed the "alternative protocols" and have been dubbed the
"Type B" rules. These were first published in 1986, and were
amended and republished in 1988.196 Final "Type A" rules set-
ting forth the "standard methodologies for conducting simplified
natural resource damage assessments" were published in 1987
and amended in 1988.197 In essence, both types of rules pre-
scribed phased actions and analyses for deriving a NRD as-
sessment value and presenting a demand for damages to defen-
dants. 9 ' Type A assessments use computer models to deter-
194. Id. § 9651(c)(1). The President delegated this rulemaking responsibility to the
DOI. See Executive Order No. 12316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981), amended by Execu-
tive Order No. 12580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988). In keeping with the statutory directive,
the DOI regulations cover both CERCLA NRD for releases of hazardous substances
to the uncontrolled natural environment and NED due to oil spills into navigable
waters under the CWA. 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1994).
195. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (requiring that the regulations identify "the
best available procedures to determine such damages, including both direct and indi-
rect injury, destruction, or loss and . . . [take] into consideration factors including,
but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and the ability of the ecosystem or
resource to recover").
196. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.60-.84 (1994) (codifying 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674 (1986) and 53
Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988)).
197. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.40-.41 (1994) (codifying 52 Fed. Reg. 9042 (1987) and 53 Fed.
Reg. 9769 (1988)).
198. Phase I is the preassessment phase, during which a potential defendant must
notify the trustee of potential damage to natural resources and the trustee conducts
an initial assessment of whether natural resources have been affected by a release.
43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.25 (1994). Phase II requires the trustee to develop a systematic
assessment strategy. Id. §§ 11.30-.35. Phase III is the assessment stage, during
which the trustee will conduct either a Type A or a Type B assessment. Id. §§
11.40, .60. Phase IV, the postassessment phase, is when the trustee compiles a re-
port documenting the assessment, id. § 11.90, and provides the "potentially respon-
sible party a demand in writing for a sum certain," id. § 11.91.
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mine NRD.'99 Type B assessments, used in ecological situa-
tions not addressable by the computer models,00 substitute for
the computer modeling a three-step process to identify the natu-
21ral resource injury, 01 quantify the loss of services the natural
resource would have provided,20 2 and assign a dollar amount to
the injury and loss of services.0 3
Both regulatory efforts were immediately challenged by states,
environmental organizations, and chemical companies, who
combined forces to launch two legal actions demanding review of
the regulations in the District of Columbia Circuit.204 The D.C.
Circuit issued opinions on July 14, 1989, in Ohio v. United
States Department of the Interior"0 5 and Colorado v. United
States Department of the Interior.6 Possibly the most signifi-
cant aspect of the court's determinations was its rejection of the
directive in the Type B rules that NRD be assessed as "the lesser
of. restoration or replacement costs; or diminution of use val-
ues."2 7 The court interpreted CERCLA as mandating that res-
toration costs were to be given a "distinct preference" over di-
minished use value in measuring NRD.20° The court provided
199. 43 C.F.R. § 11.41(a) (1994). At present, Type A computer models have been
developed only for coastal and marine environments. Id. The DOI has announced
that it is developing a computer model assessment procedure for Great Lakes envi-
ronments. 53 Fed. Reg. 20,143 (1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 39,015 (1989).
200. 43 C.F.R. § 11.33 (1994).
201. 43 C.F.R. § 11.61 (1994).
202. 43 C.F.R. § 11.70 (1994).
203. 43 C.F.R. § 11.80 (1994).
204. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988) (providing that any member of the
public may petition the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to re-
view any regulation promulgated under CERCLA).
205. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
206. 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
207. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 441 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987) (emphasis add-
ed)). The court upheld a number of challenged regulatory provisions, including provi-
sions requiring satisfaction of certain acceptance criteria to establish causation of
injury and those allowing the "contingent valuation" methodology for determining lost
use values. Id. at 470, 476-77.
208. Id. at 459. The court illustrated the "enormous practical significance" of the
"lesser of' rule with an example most likely drawn from the then-recent Exxon
Valdez oil spill:
[1Imagine a hazardous substance spill that kills a rookery of fur seals
and destroys a habitat for seabirds at a sealife reserve. The lost use
value of the seals and seabird habitat would be measured by the market
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that when restoration costs are "grossly disproportionate" to use
value, an inquiry into use value is appropriate."9 The court
noted, however, that the rules direct that use value not be limit-
ed to market value, but include nonconsumptive use value as
well."' In Colorado, the court ordered the DOI to amend the
Type A rules in keeping with the holding in Ohio regarding the
use of restoration and lost use values.211
In accordance with these directives from the D.C. Circuit, the
DOI summary of the regulations published in March 1994,
maintains that the Type B rule "establishes a procedure for
calculating natural resource damages based on the costs of re-
storing, rehabilitating, replacing, and/or acquiring the equivalent
of injured resources" while also "allow[ing] for the assessment of
all use values of injured resources that are lost to the public
pending completion of restoration, rehabilitation, replacement,
and/or acquisition of equivalent resources." 12
Both the Ohio decision and the DOI regulations issued in
response contain language that comports with Rachel Carson's
philosophy. On a pragmatic level, the "lesser of' rule for assess-
ing the value of despoiled resources would have allowed pollut-
ers to pay damages for the destruction of natural resources well
below the cost of nurturing them back to health, thus breaching
Carson's commitment to the web of life. On a theoretical level,
using market value to assess the damages for injury to natural
resources would have gutted NRD law of any element of
Carson's principled belief that humans instinctively value nature
for far more than its service to us. The Ohio decision, in reject-
value of the fur seals' pelts (which would be approximately $15 each)
plus the selling price per acre of land comparable in value to that on
which the spoiled bird habitat was located. Even if, as likely, that use
value turns out to be far less than the cost of restoring the rookery and
seabird habitat, it would nonetheless be the only measure of damages
eligible for the presumption of recoverability under the Interior rule.
Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted).
209. Id. at 459.
210. Id. at 463-64.
211. Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 491 (D.C. Cir.
1989).
212. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262 (1994) (stating that "[tihe Department will soon issue a
new proposed rule to address assessment of lost nonuse values of injured resources).
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ing the "lesser of' rule, thus prodded the DOI to regulate from a
more Carsonian perspective.
These strides toward an environmental legal scheme of which
Carson would approve were taken from within a framework of
dense technical regulations, the bulk of which were approved by
the court in Ohio. The recently issued DOI regulations thus
match their predecessors by establishing an administrative pro-
cess and several technical methods for assessing the damage to
natural resources."' Like the former version, the 1994 DOI
regulations structure the assessment process into four stages,
the third of which addresses assessment plan implementation
and is divided into three steps: injury determination,
quantification, and damage determination.214 Two of these
three assessment implementation steps, injury determination
and damage determination, have spawned complex regulatory
problems, including problems in developing a system for valuing
natural resources and problems in developing a means of con-
necting an injury to a natural resource to a particular act of
pollution.215 In addition to inviting a great deal of technical
scrutiny, the issues that have developed in connection with inju-
ry determination and damage determination are ready ground
for analysis as to whether they promote or betray Rachel
Carson's philosophy."6
IV. EVALUATING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES LAW FOR
ADHERENCE TO RACHEL CARSON'S PHILOSOPHY
The examination in Part II of how and where elements of
Rachel Carson's philosophy find voice in environmental laws
indicates a pattern of initial post-Silent Spring adherence to the
notes Carson sounded, followed by a recent trend against main-
taining a special status for the environment that places the
repair and protection of nature above legal concepts like fault
and fairness. This section engages in a similar pattern of exami-
213. See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1994) (detailing the phased resource damage
assessment process).
214. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
215. See infra part IV3B.1.
216. See infra part IV.B.2.
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nation, but with a particular focus-gauging various aspects of
the still-developing NRD program to determine where NRD
stays true to Rachel Carson's philosophy and where it retreats.
At first blush, NRD language might appear to be an example
of environmental law in its least philosophical form. The simple
appearance in a number of major federal statutes of the term
"natural resource damages" does not signify any particular
stride toward protecting people's rights to enjoy nature or to-
ward utilizing the law to promote long-range ecological diversity.
After all, the term "natural resource" is utilitarian by
definition,217 thereby indicating that NRD might simply con-
stitute a means by which fishermen and farmers may attain
compensation for lost profits due to pollution of their natural
commodities.21
As do certain features of CERCLA, the court's analysis of
NRD in Ohio indicated that the law of NRD is not to be bound
by any such limited, profit-oriented reading. For example, the
simple distinction in CERCLA section 107 between response
action liability and NRD liability indicates a legislative recogni-
tion that the eradication of a toxic health threat through a re-
sponse action does not fully address the problems visited on the
natural environment by toxins.219 In contrast, CERCLA ex-
pressly constrains NRD claims with legal limitations that do not
apply to response action claims. CERCLA allows private causes
of action for response cost claims only,2 prohibits NRD claims
217. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 788 (1985) (defining
.natural resource" as "industrial materials and capacities (as mineral deposits and
waterpower) supplied by nature"); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1507 (1986) ("capacities (as native wit) or materials (as mineral deposits and wa-
terpower) supplied by nature"); cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (6th ed. 1990)
("Any material in its native state which when extracted has economic value... [and
also] features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and
benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof. .. ").
218. Carson teaches us that our distinctions between elements of nature that have
some utility to humans and those that do not is meaningless. Using narrative factu-
al essay, Parson shows how all environmental degradation is connected and how
significant alterations of any segment of the environment at some point affect some
direct, utilitarian resource to humans. See CARSON, supra note 22, at 2, 3, 8, 43, 50
(reviewing effects on the drinking water supply, livestock, crops, health, and fish
supplies).
219. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C) (1988).
220. See, e.g., Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir.
[Vol. 37:381432
ENVIRONMENTALISM'S RITE OF SPRING
when injury to natural resources occurred pursuant to permitted
or licensed activity, limits NRD to "sums... [which can be used]
to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural
resources," and prohibits recovery "where such damages and the
release of a hazardous substance from which such damages,
resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980.""' It
thus appears that a Congress with the vision to recognize the
importance of natural resource restoration nonetheless faltered
when it legislated on the matter, weighing down the ecologically
advanced NRD claim with legal checks and balances that Con-
gress had seen fit to eliminate from other environmental laws.
This section examines NRD law in greater depth through use
of the three facets of Carson's philosophy identified in Part II:
the right to a clean environment, the responsibility to maintain
species diversity, and the instinct to protect nature.
A. NRD Law's Response to Carson's Right to a Nontoxic
Environment: Revival of the Public Trust Doctrine
To the question "But doesn't the government protect us from
[contamination by pesticides]?" the answer is, "Only to a limit-
ed extent." 22
2
As noted above, CERCLA allows private parties to bring ac-
tions for response costs, but does not provide for a private cause
of action to recover for NRD.2' In addition, states cannot re-
1993) (discussing the fact that private parties may not bring claims for NED).
221. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), (f)(1); see also United States v. Wade, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,435 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1984) (finding that a defen-
dant may still be liable for NRD, even where the defendant demonstrates that the
entire disposal took place before December 11, 1980, because releases to the envi-
ronment could continue after that date). But cf. In re Acushnet River & New Bed-
ford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 716 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D. Mass.
1989) (holding that a trustee can recover for all damages to a resource when the de-
fendant cannot establish that damages are divisible into pre- and post-December 11,
1980, amounts).
222. CARSON, supra note 22, at 181.
223. See Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 644-45 (3d. Cir.
1988); Lutz v. Chromate'x, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 419 (M.D. Pa. 1989); United
States v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,001
(E.D. Pa.-July 2, 1986).
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cover for damages to private parties or to purely private proper-
ty."4 Instead, CERCLA and other major statutes addressing
NRD assign the responsibility to protect natural resources to
government officials designated as trustees, public servants
bound to act in the interest of present and future members of
the public.2" Trustee responsibility encompasses the natural
resources "belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertain-
ing to" the government trustee in question.226
224. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 460-61 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). The Ohio court found that Congress deliberately excluded private proper-
ty from the definition of natural resources, but that trustees were authorized to
protect more than natural resources on government-owned land. Id. at 461. "[A]
substantial degree of government regulation, management, or other form of control
over the property[, however,] would be sufficient to make the CERCLA natural re-
source damage provisions applicable. Id.; cf. Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transp.,
Inc., No. 88-1279, 1991 WL 22479, at *5 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 1991) (holding that
Idaho is a trustee under CERCLA and a common-law parens patriae for all of
Idaho's wildlife and sport fish).
225. CERCLA authorizes trustees representing the United States or an individual
state to sue for NRD, assigning to the President the task of designating federal offi-
cials to serve as trustees and to state governors the task of designating state offi-
cials to serve in that capacity. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(f)(1), (f)(2)(A)-(B). Under
the OPA, the designated trustee may be a federal, state, or local government official,
an Indian tribe official, or a trustee designated by a foreign government. See OPA,
33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The CWA makes federal or state represen-
tatives eligible for trustee status. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (1988).
The President has designated the Secretaries of Defense, Interior, Agriculture,
Commerce, and Energy as federal trustees of natural resources under their respec-
tive jurisdictions. Exec. Order No. 12580, 3 C.F.R. 193 (1988). In accordance with
this directive, the National Contingency Plan designates various federal officials to
act as trustee of natural resources under their jurisdiction. Officials designated in-
clude the Secretary of the Interior (migratory birds, marine mammals, endangered
species, certain federally managed water resources, and other resources); the Secre-
tary of Commerce (resources located in or under the continental shelf, tidally influ-
enced waters, waters navigable by deep draft vessels, and other locations); and
heads of other departments, such as Agriculture, Defense, and Energy (natural re-
sources located on, over, or under land managed by an agency within the particular
department). See 40 C.F.R. § 300.600(b) (1994). Some courts have extended the class
of potential trustees to include municipalities. See New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F.
Supp. 609, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F.
Supp. 663, 667 (D.N.J. 1985); see also Peter H. Lehner, Cities as Environmental
Plaintiffs: A Guide to Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 24 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2080 (Apr. 8, 1994) (detailing in what ways and for what reasons cities
should enforce environmental laws).
226. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0(1); OPA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2706(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V
1993). Consistent with the breadth of government authority under the common-law
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Historically, government officials have protected the interests
of the public in nonprivate lands under the doctrine of public
trust, and the NRD trustee structure hearkens back to this
underutilized model for environmental protection." The public
trust doctrine dates back to Roman civil law, and its mystique
as an ancient but enduring doctrine for the benign defense of the
earth's wild creatures, shorelines, waters, wetlands, parklands,
and even air against human predators is consistent with
Carson's philosophy.' Use of the public trust doctrine, how-
ever, has generally been confined to ensuring public access to
navigable waters and adjacent shorelines,229 and, in at least
one recent case involving a state's attempt to protect its shore-
line, no member of the Supreme Court made mention of the
public trust, even in passing, as a potential argument in favor of
the state's regulation." From this perspective, the incorpora-
tion of the public trust model into the NRD provisions of sever-
al major statutes may represent a positive reminder to govern-
ment officials, particularly those in the agriculture, forestry,
and other environmentally related agencies, that overriding all
of their individual actions and decisions is an obligation to
doctrine of public trust, the preamble to the 1994 DOI NED rules indicates that the
regulations are "available for assessments of all natural resources covered by
CERCLA, which under the plain language of the statute includes more than just re-
sources owned by the government," and that recovery under the rule should not
hinge "solely on ownership of a resource by a government entity." 59 Fed. Reg.
14,265 (1994). Rather than attempting to interpret more precisely the scope of the
statutory definition, the DOI rule assigns to trustees the responsibility to explain the
basis of asserted NRD authority in both the Notice of Intent to Perform an Assess-
ment and in the Assessment Plan. Id.
227. See Thomas L. Eggert & Kathleen A. Chorostecki, Rusty Trustees and the Lost
Pots of Gold: Natural Resource Damage Trustee Coordination Under the Oil Pollution
Act, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 291, 298 (1993); see also Anthony R. Chase, Remedying
CERCLA's Natural Resource Damages Provision: Incorporation of the Public Trust
Doctrine into Natural Resource Damages Actions, 11 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 353, 354 n.7
(1992) (outlining the historical scope of the public trust doctrine).
228. See Eggert & Chorostecki, supra note 227, at 296-97 n.30 (quoting WILLIAAI H.
RODGERS, JR., ENViRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 173 (1st ed. 1977) ("It takes no great
inferential leap to conclude that public trust protection ought to be extended to all
air, water, and land resources, the preservation of which is important to society.")).
229. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (detailing the na-
ture of the public trust doctrine, past and present).
230. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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present and future generations to prevent an irrevocable imbal-
ance in nature.
Of course, the trustee mandates in the NRD provisions of the
major federal statutes and their implementing regulations do
constrain trustees from the breadth of the common-law exercise
of public trust authority. For example, CERCLA trustees may
not recover for damages to natural resources caused by releases
subject to federal permits. 1 In addition, defendants are not
liable for damages to natural resources caused by releases that
occur due to activity for which an EIS has been prepared under
NEPA, when the EIS demonstrates that the NRD in question
were identified as an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment
of natural resources." 2 As noted above, the measure of dam-
ages excludes punitive damages and damages resulting from an
event of pollution occurring wholly prior to CERCLA's enact-
ment."' CERCLA does include the reasonable cost of assessing
injury to natural resources in the scope of damages, 4 but in-
hibits trustees from utilizing the Fund to restore, rehabilitate,
replace, or acquire the equivalent of natural resources.'
These statutory limits on trustee operation, when combined with
the daunting regulatory burdens inherent in the determinations
of injury and damages, suggest that Congress has not yet whole-
heartedly converted to Carson's philosophy."
231. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (1988).
232. Id.
233. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
235. Id. § 9611(i).
Except in a situation requiring action to avoid an irreversible loss of
natural resources or to prevent or reduce any continuing danger to natu-
ral resources or similar need for emergency action, funds may not be
used under this chapter for the restoration, rehabilitation, or replacement
or acquisition of the equivalent of any natural resources until a plan for
the use of such funds for such purposes has been developed and adopted
by affected [trustees] ... after adequate public notice and opportunity
for hearing and consideration of all public comment.
Id.
236. See infra parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2 (discussing injury and damage determinations).
Certain courts addressing the constraints on CERCLA trustees bringing NRD claims
have evidenced clearer adherence to the Carson philosophy than Congress. For ex-
ample, in In re Acuslnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893 (D. Mass.
1989), Judge Young held that the defendants bore the burden of establishing that an
436
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Perhaps a more elemental deviation from the Carson ideal
regarding people's personal rights to live in a nontoxic environ-
ment is that CERCLA's NRD provisions allow only government
trustees to assert the public trust rights of the general popula-
tion. 7 This limitation does not represent a diminishment of
NRD public trust protection from its common-law roots, as pub-
lic trust has historically been asserted by statesY It does,
however, redirect the individual's efforts to protect natural re-
sources toward citizen suits to compel government trustees to
carry out their duties," and, in this redirection, may dilute
the impact of NRD law more than Carson would find comfort-
able. In Silent Spring, Carson does 'not present herself as an
individual who trusts her government to protect her rights, or
event of pollution injuring natural resources was federally permitted. Id. at 901. In
addition, Judge Young held that, when government trustees can demonstrate that at
least some of the release of contamination to the environment was not federally
permitted, the defendants bear the burden of establishing what portion of the dam-
ages should be allocated to the permitted release. Id. In an earlier decision, Judge
Young had found that, when injury to natural resources has occurred both before
and after CERCLA's enactment date, the defendant in a NRD action bears the bur-
den of showing that NRD are divisible into pre- and post-CERCLA enactment
amounts to avoid liability for pre-enactment damages. See In re Acushnet River New
Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 716 F. Supp. 676, 686 (D.
Mass. 1989). Finally, although CERCLA limits access to the Fund to respond to
natural resource injuries, at least one court has found that "there is no requirement
that money must be expended by the state before it can seek to recover for damages
to natural resources." New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 298
(N.D.N.Y. 1984).
237. See supra notes 225, 227 and accompanying text. In contrast, CERCLA also
authorizes private parties to bring cost recovery suits for costs incurred in the clean-
up of hazardous substances released to the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
238. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (describing the
state as the final authority over "whether its mountains shall be stripped of their
forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air"); see also Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 337 (1979), as having rejected the erroneous theory that a state owns the wild-
life within its borders, recognizing instead that "states retain an important interest
in the regulation and conservation of wildlife and natural resources . . . 'as legiti-
mate local purposes similar to the States' interests in protecting the health and
safety of their citizens") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). But
see Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (recognizing
standing in five private citizens as beneficiaries of the public trust).
239. The citizen suit provisions of both CERCLA, and the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1988), provide private citizens with a legal means of forcing trustees who fail to
adequately protect the natural resources entrusted to their care to fulfill their duties.
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the rights of future generations, to a balanced environment. In a
passage closing a lengthy cataloging of human and wildlife suf-
fering due to DDT exposure, Carson wrote:
Who has decided-who has the right to decide-for the
countless legions of people who were not consulted that the
supreme value is a world without insects, even though it be
also a sterile world ungraced by the curving wing of a bird
in flight? The decision is that of the authoritarian tempo-
rarily entrusted with power; he has made it during a mo-
ment of inattention by millions to whom beauty and the
ordered world of nature still have a meaning that is deep
and imperative.24°
Because NRD law relegates private attorneys general to the
role of policing the work of government trustees, it shares, with
other environmental laws, a shortcoming discussed in Part
II.41 Although citizens may have rights in the environment,
their inability to directly assert those rights puts them at the
mercy of a legal system not designed to override procedural and
other legal technicalities on behalf of the ecosphere. Indeed, the
plaintiffs in Alaska Sports Fishing Ass'n v. Exxon Corp.242 may
have enjoyed a rather hollow victory when the Ninth Circuit
implicitly recognized their asserted claims in negligence and
nuisance for the lost use and enjoyment of natural resources due
to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.243 Because this lost use could be
addressed in the government trustee consent decree with Exxon,
and because the individual plaintiffs were in privity with the
NRD trustees under the doctrine of parens patriae, their private
claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. 44
B. NRD Law's Response to Carson's Recognition of the
Importance of Maintaining Ecological Diversity
The CERCLA hazardous waste cleanup program, remarkable
for its sweeping liability and the paltry arsenal of affirmative
240. CARSON, supra note 22, at 127.
241. See supra notes 71, 94-95 and accompanying text.
242. 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 1994).
243. Id. at 772-73.
244. Id. at 773-74.
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defenses it offers defendants," is a statutory scheme that
promotes Carson's view that cleaning up pollution is a more
important social goal than measuring degrees of culpability. In
contrast, the CWA, the OPA, and CERCLA all make clear from
their statutory language alone that Congress intended to im-
pose significant restraints on NRD liability. For example,
CERCLA imposes a $50 million cap on NRD liability for each
release from a facility. 6 The CWA and the OPA contain simi-
lar limitations."' No such liability cap limits CERCLA clean-
up liability.248
245. The limited affirmative defenses against CEROLA liability include cases in
which a defendant is able to establish that the contamination and its resulting dam-
ages, for which he is otherwise liable, "were caused solely by-(1) an act of God; (2)
an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party [unrelated to the defendant in
any way and associated with the release of contamination]; or (4) any combination of
the [preceding defenses]." See CEROLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988).
246. Id. §§ 9607(c)(1)(C)-(D). This cap is lifted if the release was caused by "willful
misconduct or willful negligence" or by a violation of "applicable safety, construction,
or operating standards or regulations." Id. § 9607(c)(2).
247. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(f)(1)-(3) (1988) (setting a $50 million cap on lia-
bility, which is lifted if the discharge was the result of "willful negligence or willful
misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner"); see also id. § 1321(q)
(authorizing the President to limit liability to less than $50 million, but not less
than $8 million for onshore or offshore facilities); OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (Supp. V
1993) (setting liability caps for tank vessels ($10 million), other vessels ($500,000),
offshore facilities other than deep water ports (removal costs plus $75 million), and
onshore facilities or deep water ports ($350 million)). As in CERCLA and the CWA,
the OPA removes such limits on liability if the incident "was proximately caused
by-gross negligence or willful misconduct" or "the violation of an applicable Federal
safety, construction, or operating regulation.m " Id. § 2704(c)(1). As in the OWA, the
OPA authorizes the President to limit liability to not more than $350 million and
not less than $8 million for onshore facilities. Id. § 2704(d)(1).
248. See 42 U.S.CA. §§ 9601-9670 (West 1995). For further discussion of limitations
to the CEROLA NRD claim not imposed on the response action claim, see supra
notes 220-21, 244 and accompanying text; infra note 252 and accompanying text.
One issue that has not been determined conclusively is whether a CERCLA NRD
action may be brought in connection with a threat of release. CERCLA clearly pro-
vides that defendants may be liable for costs incurred in connection with cleanup
actions taken in response to a threatened release. See supra notes 153-54 and ac-
companying text. The NOAA proposed regulations implementing the OPA also allow
for the assessment of damages based on the diminished use of a resource resulting
from the threat of an oil spill. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,827 (1995) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 990.10 (proposed Aug. 3, 1995)). In contrast, the DOI regulations imple-
menting CERCLA's NRD claim address only damages resulting from an actual re-
lease or discharge. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,279 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
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This and other distinctions between cleanup liability and NRD
liability indicate that, along with Congress's definitive prioritiza-
tion in CERCLA of environmental cleanup over legal obstacles
like fault and causation,249 Congress also prioritized cleanup
over NRD restoration and thus did not sweep the path to NRD
enforcement clear of legal obstacles. Perhaps the most telling
sign of congressional reticence to allow ready implementation of
the ultimate goals of NRD was Congress's allocation of the bur-
den of proving liability. For cleanup costs, CERCLA makes de-
fendants liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action in-
curred by the [government plaintiff] not inconsistent with the
[CERCLA regulations]."" Courts have interpreted this lan-
guage as indicating that government cleanup actions and the
costs incurred are to be considered presumptively and directly
translated into liabilities."1
In contrast, when designating liability for NRD, CERCLA
uses the term "damages for injury," whereas it uses the term
"costs... incurred" in its cleanup liability section, thus requir-
ing the plaintiff trustees to translate injuries, destruction, and
losses suffered by natural resources into damages, or legal liabil-
itiesm The girth of this burden on NRD trustees is difficult to
comprehend until one engages in a cursory review of the DOI
regulations detailing the method for establishing injury to natu-
ral resources.
249. See supra notes 146-57 and accompanying text.
250. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
251. For examples of cases interpreting the phrase "response costs" broadly, see
Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988) ("Congress
intended the term 'response costs' to encompass a broad range of activities and that
the provisions defining response costs be interpreted liberally."); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 850
(W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
252. Compare CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) ("damages for injury") with id. §
9607(a)(4)(A) ("all costs . . . incurred").
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1. Injury Determination and the Acceptance Criteria: Law
Confronts the Web of Life
The DOI rule implementing the NRD provisions of CERCLA
and the CWA sets forth a methodology under which trustees
may identify and assess an "injury" to natural resources. 3
The general definition of "injury" in the regulations, applicable
to all natural resources, is
a measurable adverse change, either long- or short-term, in
the chemical or physical quality or the viability of a natural
resource resulting either directly or indirectly from exposure
to a discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance, or
exposure to a product of reactions resulting from the dis-
charge of oil or release of a hazardous substance.254
This definition requires trustees to meet two burdens in estab-
lishing an injury to natural resources. First, trustees must es-
tablish the occurrence of an adverse change in the chemical or
physical quality or the viability of a natural resource, detected
through observation or scientific methods. 5 To assist trustees
in meeting this requirement, the DOI regulations provide stan-
dards which, if exceeded, identify the presence of an injury. 6
In addition, trustees must trace the adverse change in the
resource to the hazardous substance or oil released or dis-
charged by the defendant. 7 The requirement that trustees es-
253. 43 C.F.R. § 11.60 (1994).
254. Id. § 11.14(v). In addition to the general definition of "injury," the DOI regula-
tions set forth specific definitions for various types of natural resources addressed
under CERCLA. Id. § 11.62. For air, surface water, and groundwater, the regula-
tions reference existing federal and state regulatory standards and criteria. Id. §§
11.62(b)-(d). For biological and geological resources, however, with the exception of
federal and state consumption guidelines, no standards or criteria defining injury
exist. For these resources, the DOI developed specific injury definitions. Id. §§
11.62(e)-(f).
255. Id. §§ 11.62(e)-(f).
256. Id. § 11.62(f)(2). The method for establishing an adverse change in the viabili-
ty of a biological resource relies on measurable biological symptoms, characteristics,
or other indicators of diminished viability, such as death, disease, behavioral abnor-
malities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions, or physical deformity
of organisms. Id. § 11.62(f)()(i).
257. The regulation directs that trustees establish whether "one or more natural
resources have been injured as a result of the discharge of oil or release of a haz-
ardous substance." Id. § 11.13(e)(1).
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tablish a pathway of contamination linking the natural re-
source injury to the discharge or release that originally in-
voked liability constitutes a causation element; to establish
an "injury" for which a defendant may be found liable, trust-
ees must trace detrimental effects on natural resources back
to a release of hazardous substances or discharge of oil that
caused the detrimental effects and for which the defendant is
responsible." S
To meet this second element of the injury requirement, trust-
ees must establish that the measurable adverse biological
change detected in the first step of the injury determination
differs from any measurable adverse biological change occurring
naturally to background population levels. Trustees also must
establish that the measurable adverse biological change estab-
lishing injury exceeds any adverse changes resulting from other
injury-causing factors in the general assessment area. 9 Final-
ly, trustees must establish that the injured natural resources
were first injured as a result of the defendant's polluting act."'
Trustees thus face a significant proof obstacle in the enforce-
ment of their NRD obligations. Unfortunately for trustees,
living organisms constantly respond to many presences and
events in their natural habitat, with or without an event of
pollution.2"' These presences and events may include nonhu-
man changes, such as weather changes, changes in heat or
light, seasonal changes, changes in food supplies, changes
caused by predators, and even changes caused by the presence
of other members of the same species. 2 Organisms may also
respond to effects humans visit on them or their habitats
unrelated to a particular event of pollution, such as
overfishing and habitat alteration.26 In combination or indi-
258. See id.
259. Id. § 11.62(f)(3).
260. See David R. Rosenberger, Determination of Injury: In CERCLA's Natural Re-
source Damage Assessment Regulations, presented at the seminar, "The New Rules
for Natural Resource Damage Assessments and Claims Under CERCLA and OPA,"
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vidually, these presences, events, and effects may easily result
in an untraceable number of behavioral, biochemical, physio-
logical, or genetic responses, any of which might be measurable
as adverse. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an adverse biological
change to a natural resource that is not a response to a collec-
tion of causes.2" In other words, due to the non-isolated nature
of the ecosphere, an observed biological response occurring in
the vicinity of a discharge or release does not easily allow trust-
ees to reach a legal conclusion that the response was caused by
the discharge or release and constituted an "injury" as defined
by the DOI regulations. Without further investigation, such a
situation only allows a conclusion that some presence or event,
or combination of presences and events, in the organism's envi-
ronment has or have negatively impacted its viability.265
2. NRD Injury/Causation: An Anti-Carsonian Roadblock in
the Path of a Very Carsonian Goal
Any reader of Rachel Carson must conclude that the require-
ment that trustees prove injury could eviscerate the NRD claim
from within, because in the web of life no ecological change
occurs in the sterile isolation required for proof of causation.266
CERCLA attempts to save its NRD program from failing due to
the very ecological phenomenon that the Act strives to respect
by mandating that NRD regulations "identify the best available
procedures to determine such damages."6 7 This provision in-
vites the legal conclusion that, as long as trustees adhere to
whatever they are able to establish as the "best" standardized
procedures for measuring injury, then the law will accept the
injury-causation chain they forge, however fragile its links.
The standardized system for identifying and evaluating the
procedures for measuring injury, dubbed the biological "accep-
tance criteria!' in the DOI regulations, utilizes a screening mech-
anism to evaluate scientific and generally accepted knowledge
about particular adverse biological responses to releases of pollu-
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See CARSON, supra note 22, at 5-13.
267. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1988).
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tion into the natural environment."8 The acceptance criteria
are the criteria under which trustees determine whether the
scientific community would recognize a causal relationship be-
tween an event of pollution and a measured injury to a natural
resource.
269
Because the acceptance criteria are intended to be a means of
identifying and utilizing the "best available" science, and be-
cause the best available science may be argued to be all
CERCLA asks of trustees when identifying an injury to natural
resources, the acceptance criteria might supply an answer to the
NRD trustees' causation problem by supplying a semblance of
the isolated causation chain that the law demands when the
realities of actual ecological conditions and sketchy scientific
knowledge would otherwise defeat a NRD claim. However, the
acceptance criteria regulations do not legitimize unproven or
rudimentary (albeit "best") science. The DOI recognized that
some biological responses are not well understood by the scien-
tific community.27 ° For such biological responses, the accep-
tance criteria can lead to a conclusion that the "best" science is
still inadequate to meet the causation standard of CERCLA.
It is somewhat ironic that the law addressing the assessment
of damages for injury to natural resources, while so conceptually
compatible with Rachel Carson's ideal that humans must re-
spond to our instinct to respect and nurture our environment,
should be severely handicapped in its operation due to its incom-
patibility.with another primary teaching of Carson's, that of the
268. 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(f)(2) (1994). The regulations set forth four acceptance crite-
ria. The first acceptance criterion is met when the biological response observed is
often the result of exposure to oil or hazardous substances. Id. § 11.62(f)(2)(i). The
second acceptance criterion is met when exposure to oil or hazardous substances is
known to cause the observed biological response in free-ranging organisms. Id.
§ 11.62(f)(2)(ii). The tldrd acceptance criterion is met when exposure to oil or haz-
ardous substances is known to cause the observed biological response in controlled
experiments. Id. § 11.62(f)(2)(iii). The final acceptance criterion is met when the
biological response measurement is practical to perform (sufficiently routine) and
produces scientifically valid results. Id. § 11.62(f)(2)(iv). For a list of the 18 types of
biological responses in fish and wildlife species, including both lethal and sublethal
responses, that have been found to satisfy the acceptance criteria, see id.
§ 11.62(f)(4).
269. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.62(f) (1994).
270. See 51 Fed. Reg. 27,710 (1986) (responding to comments).
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interconnectedness of all members of the ecosphere. In Ohio v.
United States Department of the Interior,27 the plaintiffs char-
acterized the acceptance criteria as being extraordinarily bur-
densome and as requiring a greater quantum of evidence of
causation than the common law required."2 The D.C. Circuit
responded by stating that "legislative history illustrates... that
a motivating force behind the CERCLA natural resource damage
provisions was Congress' dissatisfaction with the common
law." '73 A committee print states that causation-of-injury stan-
dards were one of the common-law obstacles to recovery for
environmental harms that CERCLA was intended to eliminate:
[P]laintiffs in toxic pollution suits may have substantial diffi-
culty in proving that a particular exposure to a pollutant was
the cause in fact of an injury. The case studies reinforce the
notion that such problems of proof can be significant barriers
to recovery. 4
The court ruled in Ohio, however, that CERCLA is ambigu-
ous on the question of whether the causation-of-injury stan-
dard under CERCLA section -107(a)(4)(C) must be less de-
manding than that of common law and therefore upheld the
acceptance criteria. 5  The causation-of-injury burden on
NRD trustees thus stands firm as possibly the single most
significant indicator of the law's reticence to embrace
Carson's ideal of environmentalism.
271. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
272. Id. at 469.
273. Id. at 455; see also id. at 455 n.38 (citing S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 13-14 (1980), for the proposition that "[tlraditional tort law presents substantial
barriers to recovery . . . . [Clompensation ultimately provided to injured parties is
generally inadequate.").
274. Id. at 470 (quoting SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCE POLLU-
TION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS; A RE-
PORT PREPARED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 517 (Comm. Print 1980)).
275. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 472.
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C. NRD "Contingent Valuation" and the Moral Instinct To
Protect the Environment
Conceptually, the most poetic and profound element of NRD
law is the effort to reflect the nonutilitarian loss to humans of a
polluted natural environment. CERCLA's simple directive that
liability include damages for "loss of natural resources '27 6 has
spawned a great deal of debate over how and whether the law
can derive a damage figure reflecting people's moral or emotion-
al suffering due to their knowledge of harm to a species, habitat,
or other element of the natural world. 7 Much of this debate
has focused on the contingent valuation methodology (CVM), a
survey method for deriving a dollar figure reflecting the sense of
loss humans experience when a species is destroyed or its exis-
tence is threatened or when human access to and enjoyment of
nature is made impossible by pollution.
2 8
1. Background and Overview of Contingent Valuation
Methodology
As noted above, the DOI regulations implementing CERCLA's
NRD provisions were challenged in the Ohio and Colorado com-
panion cases in part for designating NRD as the "lesser of' res-
toration and loss use values.2 79 Following guidance from Ohio,
the 1994 DOI regulations provide that the monetary measure of
NRD is the estimated cost of the restoration, rehabilitation,
replacement, or acquisition of equivalent resources. ° In addi-
276. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1988).
277. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 172.
278. For trustees to arrive at an economic value for damages to natural resources,
the regulations provide a number of valuation methods that trustees may use sepa-
rately or in combination with other methods. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,264 (1994)
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
279. See Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 490-91 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462-64; supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
280. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,263 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11). There
is no preference for restoration over acquisition of the equivalent resource. Id. at
14,275. When restoration or acquisition of the equivalent resource is "grossly dispro-
portionate" to lost value, however, trustees are directed to select the less costly
method between restoration and acquisition. Id. at 14,271. Indeed, pursuant to Puer-
to Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), natural recovery is al-
lowable as a restoration method in limited circumstances, for reasons such as cost-
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tion, the measure of damages includes the "compensable value"
of the services lost to the public." 1 In other words, where natu-
ral resources will be restored, the DOI regulations translate into
monetary terms the loss suffered by the public for nonuse during
the time between the injury and full restoration of the natural
resource in question.
The Ohio decision also rejected the 1987 rule's hierarchy of
damage assessment methodologies, which limited recovery for
lost natural resources to the price a resource would command on
the open market. Realizing that some of the value of natural
resources cannot be fully measured in marketplace terms, the
court concluded that a presumption in favor of marketplace
value and appraisal methodology would fall short of Congress's
intent that the damage assessment regulations "capture fully all
aspects of loss."" The court ordered the DOI to revise the rule
to cover all reliably calculated lost values of injured natural re-
sources, including both lost use values and lost nonuse values,
with no specific hierarchy of methodologies for trustees to derive
those values.' The use values are the more market-translat-
able values of a natural resource, encompassing both consump-
tive uses, such as hunting and fishing, in which resources are
harvested, and nonconsumptive uses, such as hiking and bird
watching, in which the activity does not reduce the stock or
resources.' Nonuse values have the capacity to encompass a
far greater field of people, as they "are not dependent on use of
the resource."'
effectiveness, cost-benefits, concern for additional injury, and the technical
infeasibility of non-natural recovery. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,271 (1994).
281. 59 Fed. Reg. 12,262, 14,264 (1994).
282. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 463; see also id., at 462-63 ("From the bald eagle to the
blue whale and snail darter, natural resources have values that are not fully cap-
tured by the market system.").
283. Id. at 464.
284. See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,263-64 (1994) (to be codified at 43 C.FR.
pt. 11) (stating that a market-price methodology should be used to estimate lost use
values).
285. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,262, 14,263 (1994) ("Nonuse values include existence value,
which is the value of knowing that a resource exists, and bequest value, which is
the value of knowing that a resource will be available for future generations."). The
term "passive values" has also been used to refer to the same concept. See Ohio,
880 F.2d at 464; see also Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553, 566 (C.D.
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CVM, the only method currently available to estimate nonuse
values, uses survey questionnaires to derive both use and non-
use values of injured natural resources. The CVM constructs a
hypothetical market to measure willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept compensation for different levels of
nonmarketed natural resources."s Neither the DOI nor the
Utah 1992) (describing "bequest value" in a slightly more utilitarian way-as "option
value .. .the value associated with an individual's desire to preserve the option to
use the natural resource, even if it is not currently being used"), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 197 (1994).
Possibly confusing is the court's upholding in Ohio of the regulation's require-
ment that a trustee may only recover for NED if those resources had a "committed
use," Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462, which is defined as "either: a current public use; or a
planned public use of a natural resource for which there is a documented legal,
administrative, budgetary, or financial commitment established before the discharge
of oil or release of a hazardous substance is detected," 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(h) (1994).
This language apparently suggests that areas of undeveloped, "uncommitted" natural
resources could only suffer very limited injury. The court in Ohio, however, deter-
mined that the "committed use" requirement is only relevant when trustees seek
damages for conjectural categories of use. See Ohio, 880 F.2d at 462. In short, if
recovery is sought only for funds to restore the resource, then the committed use
definition does not apply. See id.
286. The method involves in-person or telephone interviews or a mail questionnaire.
Elements common to CVM questionnaires include: (1) an explanation of the structure
and rules of the market in which the good or service being valued is either bought
or sold; (2) a description of the good or service and how it is to be provided; (3) the
value elicitation question; and (4) validation questions, to verify comprehension and
acceptance of the scenario and to elicit socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics
to interpret the reasonableness of variation in respondents' responses to the valua-
tion question.
One of the variables in a CVM survey is the method in which a value is
elicited from surveyed individuals for the resource in question. Value elicitation can
be performed in three ways. First, there may be an open-ended WTP question for-
mat that simply asks the respondent to state his or her maximum WTP in dollars.
Another value elicitation procedure is the close-ended "iterative bidding" type
question. Here the interviewer states an initial dollar amount and the respondent
decides whether lie or she would pay. If the respondent professes a WTP, the in-
terviewer raises the amount until the respondent declines to pay. The highest dollar
amount receiving a positive response is recorded as the person's maximum WTP. (If
a negative response is received to the initial dollar amount, then the amounts are
lowered until the interviewer receives a positive response.) In the interactive ap-
proach, poor selection of the starting value may influence the respondent's final
reported value.
The approach favored by many economists is called dichotomous choice or "ref-
erendum." Under this approach, a respondent answers "yes" or "no" to one randomly
assigned dollar amount chosen by the interviewer. For a general overview of CVM,
see, for example, Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive
ENVIRONMENTALISM'S RITE OF SPRING
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regu-
lations are able to set forth any universal rules on how each ele-
ment of a CVM questionnaire should be designed, as appropriate
formulations depend on the natural resource being valued and
its context.2
7
2. The Response to Contingency Valuation: Carson's Moral
Philosophy Meets the Law of Evidence
Without doubt, Rachel Carson would support the law's recog-
nition of nonuse value:
To the bird watcher, the suburbanite who derives joy from
birds in his garden, the hunter, the fisherman or the explorer
of wild regions, anything that destroys the wildlife of an area
for even a single year has deprived him of pleasure to which
he has a legitimate right. This is a valid point of view. Even
if, as has sometimes happened, some of the birds and mam-
mals and fishes are able to re-establish themselves after a
single spraying [of pesticides], a great and real harm has
been done.2s
Carson is far from being a lone radical in this regard, as even
the critics of CVM admit that survey results indicate a positive
value for natural resources not used as human utilities.289 Crit-
ics of CVM generally attack its imprecision and its lack of scien-
tific validity, arguing that it falls far short of economic stan-
Use: Damages from the Exxon Valdez, in THE NEW RULES, supra note 167, at 523;
Carol A. Jones, Contingent Valuation Method, in id. at 581; John B. Loomis, The
Basics of Contingent Valuation Method, in id. at 589.
287. As part of the process of writing regulations implementing the OPA, the
NOAA convened the Contingent Valuation Panel, chaired by Nobel Laureate Profes-
sors Kenneth Arrow and Robert Solow, to evaluate CVM as a measure of nonuse
values. The Panel issued a report setting forth requirements to achieve reliability in
CVM. The four categories of requirements included in the proposed OPA rule are:
(1) survey design requirements; (2) survey administration requirements; (3) internal
validity checks on the nature of the results; and (4) complete reporting of survey
instruments, data, and analysis, plus documentation of rationale for design choices.
See 58 Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993).
288. CARSON, supra note 22, at 86-87.
289. See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental Loss: Using
Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE L.J. 887, 908 (1994)
(citing sources indicating that CVM surveys result in a .positive nonuse value as well
as a naysayer who admits the point).
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dards for accurate surveying and thus fails to meet legal stan-
dards for admission of expert evidence.29
The legal argument rests on the well-established rule of ad-
missibility of expert evidence that has its root in Federal Rule of
Evidence 401, addressing relevancy. Expert evidence is relevant
if it is based on "principles evolved by experience or science, ap-
plied logically to the situation at hand.""29 In addition, expert
testimony must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact at issue." '92 Arguably, CVM's
heavy reliance on survey methodology renders the validity of its
scientific basis questionable, and thus its potential for assisting
the trier of fact is weakened by the danger of a fact finder rely-
ing more on survey results than is merited.
Adding to the potential for overreliance on CVM results by fact
finders is Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which provides that if
the data that an expert relies on in presenting an opinion are "of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence."293 CVM critics support this
hurdle to CVM survey admissibility with the Supreme Court's
statement on admissibility of proffered scientific evidence set
forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals:294 "the trial
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."95
Arguments offered against the reliability of CVM focus on the
difficulty individuals have in casting their amorphous concerns
290. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 172, at 610-17.
291. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
292. FED. R. EVID. 702.
293. FED. R. EVID. 703.
294. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
295. Id. at 2795. Daubert replaced Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), as the general rule for admissibility of scientific evidence. Frye required that
before novel scientific methods or principles could be introduced into evidence, one
must demonstrate that the method or principle has "gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. Daubert rejected the "general
acceptance" test for scientific reliability, thus dealing a blow to those who would
attack CVM for its relative newness. However, CVM critics may argue that Daubert
replaced the "general acceptance" test with a heightened requirement that trial judg-
es personally assess the reliability of offered scientific evidence.
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for natural resources in a budgetary manner. 9 ' Further evi-
dence of the inaccuracy of individual efforts to translate nonuse
values into dollars is that individuals tend to place nearly iden-
tical values on greatly differing quantities of natural resource
loss. These flaws are amplified, CVM detractors argue, when
one multiplies the error by the number of households that CVM
conjectures have suffered the losses of those completing the
surveys.29 Finally, the fact that survey results may be radical-
ly altered due to simple changes in question phraseology is an-
other vulnerability of CVM.299
Supporters of CVM, unlike its detractors, prefer to take the
broader view, finding acceptable the legalistic flaws in this
"best" method for deducing a dollar amount to stand for the
intrinsic value of nature. In other words, to CVM supporters,
CVM's evidentiary flaws are a far lesser evil than the law's
continued ignorance of nonuse value."' CVM supporters do of-
fer less broad brush support as well. They argue, for example,
that CVM perpetrates no greater upset in evidentiary law than
tort law's method (or lack thereof) for measuring pain and suf-
fering damages. 301
In spite of its numerous vulnerabilities, CVM has been uti-
lized by courts to arrive at nonuse loss values.0 2 For purposes
of serving as a measure of the law's acceptance of Carson's phi-
losophy, CVM's vulnerability to standard attacks under evidence
law underscores its demonstration of the correctness of Carson's
simplest and most abstract philosophical teachings.
296. See Dobbins, supra note 289, at 924.
297. See Thomson, supra note 172, at 611 ("In other words, 2000 oily ducks are
just as valuable as 200,000 oily ducks.") (citation omitted).
298. Dobbins, supra note 289, at 924.
299. Id. at 919-20 (discussing differences between questions asking for the dollar
amount a surveyed person would be willing to pay to preserve a natural resource
and questions asking for the dollar amount a surveyed person would be willing to
accept as compensation for a lost natural resource).
300. See id. at 937.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., Utah v. Kennecott Corp., 801 F. Supp. 553 (D. Utah 1992), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 197 (1994). As one commentator notes, continued use of CVM will
improve its methodology and help it better meet the evidentiary requirements. See
Dobbins, supra note 289, at 933.
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V. CONCLUSION: PLATER'S PARADIGM REVISITED
Have we fallen into a mesmerized state that makes us ac-
cept as inevitable that which is inferior or detrimental, as
though having lost the will or the vision to demand that
which is good? Such thinking, in the words of the ecologist
Paul Shepard, "idealizes life with only its head out of water,
inches above the limits of toleration of the corruption of its
own environment .... Why should we tolerate a diet of weak
poisons, a home in insipid surroundings, a circle of acquain-
tances who are not quite our enemies, the noise of motors with
just enough relief to prevent insanity? Who would want to live
in a world which is just not quite fatal?"3 '
Reflecting on the above survey of Carson's writing, environ-
mental law generally, and NRD law in particular, one may con-
clude that, in some ways, NRD law stands as the best our dem-
ocratic system, legal structure, and technologically obsessed
culture can achieve in keeping with Carson's philosophy. As a
validation of Carson's philosophy, the theoretical potential of
NRD nonuse valuation provides a symbol of true environmental-
ism in United States law and economics. In other ways, how-
ever, NRD law retreats from legal maneuverings that have rep-
resented progress toward the systemization of environmentalism
in the past. Congress carefully hobbled the NRD claim with
monetary caps, difficult proof requirements, and a retroactivity
ban, the likes of which had been successfully combatted under
other environmental programs.
On the one hand, such guarded validation of the NRD concept
could ward off the type of backlash that diminished the environ-
mental purity of the ESA."4 On the other hand, the statutory
controls over NRD could indicate that the law has simply spent
its full potential for environmentalism in NRD law as that law
stands today.
This Article began by discussing a paradigm developed by
Professor Plater to describe Rachel Carson's environmentalist
perspective. Plater's ultimate theory, for which he creates and
303. CARSON, supra note 22, at 12.
304. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
452 [Vol. 37:381
ENVIRONMENTALISM'S RITE OF SPRING
utilizes his Paradigm, is that the integrity of environmentalist
goals can be maintained only when environmentalists maintain
an effective presence as outsiders-challengers to the developed
system of environmental laws and politics."' In illustrating
the strengths of environmental law, Plater focuses on the power
underlying the citizen suit; indeed, Plater never mentions the
strict liability structure of CERCLA as a significant achievement
of environmentalism.
Carson writes to persuade in Silent Spring, issuing direct
appeals to her readers' sense of will and rightness, but makes
few references to law, politics, or economics in her examination
of the earth's problems and her identification of solutions. By
ignoring these major social systems that define societal behav-
ior, Carson signals, perhaps inadvertently but perhaps not, the
inadequacy of society's governing and motivational systems to
further her goal of maintaining the balance of. nature. Indeed,
Carson's decidedly nonlegal perspective may be the key to her
effectiveness as a symbol of environmental thinking.
To Carson, perhaps the most telling sign of the law's inability
to truly embrace environmentalism is NRD law's use of the
government trustee as a buffer between the polluter and the
would-be private attorneys general, thus allowing administrative
process to provide the framework and language for environmen-
tal protection in law. Like Plater, therefore, a Rachel Carson
living in America today, with today's well-developed regime of
environmental laws, might cast the true environmentalist as the
outsider of mainstream law and politics. Perhaps, now that
mainstream law and politics have attempted to assimilate envi-
ronmental concerns, we should take from Rachel Carson the
message that environmentalism must not content itself with the
statutes and policies that attempt to systemize ecological con-
cerns. Indeed, the most significant truth we who study the law
305. Indeed, Plater's full thesis is that the Rachel Carson Paradigm works together
with a second, more politically focused Pluralist Paradigm that emerged in the six-
ties and marks a shift in governance that allowed the public challenger to play a
significant role countering economic and governmental motivators in decisions im-
pacting the environment. Plater indicates that this shift toward pluralistic power
division is key to the success of the environmental movement. See Plater, supra note
21, at 1004-08.
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may bring from Carson's ecological perspective is that environ-
mentalism is a concept that is historically and unalterably for-
eign to the United States' democratic political culture. True
environmentalism, therefore, may only maintain its effectiveness
and integrity by continuing to strain the capabilities of that
political culture.
In The Sea Around Us, Rachel Carson observed that "[in the
artificial world of his cities and towns, [man] often forgets the
true nature of his planet and the long vistas of its history, in
which the existence of the race of men has occupied a mere mo-
ment of time.""' Similarly, environmentalists may forget the
relative moment, the single generation since Carson's death,
that modern environmental law has occupied in the history of
law. If Carson were alive today, she might warn environmen-
talists not to rely too heavily on the durability of the environ-
mental legal structure that has developed in this short time.
306. CARSON, supra note 126, at 15.
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